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ATHENS AND THE MACEDONIAN KINGDOM FROM PERDIKKAS II TO PHILIP II

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Résumé. – Ce travail a l’ambition de discuter à fond la documentation littéraire et épigraphique concernant la relation des rois de Macédoine et Athènes dans les années comprises entre les guerres médiques et la mort de Philippe II, et de montrer que ce qu’on considère comme hostilité des souverains envers Athènes, était en effet la réponse macédonienne aux efforts athéniens de contrôler le royaume et d’avoir accès au bois macédonien, matériel indispensable pour leur flotte.

Abstract. – The aim of this paper is to attempt to overcome the bias in our sources which are primarily Athenian, to supply the Macedonian point of view and to show that Macedonian Anti-Athenian attitudes were a justifiable response to Athenian aggression. The study covers the Classical period, from Alexander I to the death of Philip II.

Mots-clés. – Alexander I, Perdikkas II, Archelaos, Amyntas III, Alexander II, Perdikkas III, Ptolemy of Aloros, Philip II, Pelopidas, Iphicrates, Timotheos, Macedonian timber.

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The Athenian comic poet Hermippos complained that Perdikkas, the Macedonian King, was always sending to Athens oars and many lies.¹ This passage from Old Comedy provides the two main themes for my paper: timber, the reason for Athenian interest in Macedonia, and the alleged deceit of the Macedonian kings. There have been numerous discussions of the Athenian need for Macedonian timber.² What I would like to do is to defend the Macedonian kings against the Athenian charge of deceit and understand their attitudes by approaching events from their perspective. I would attempt to overcome the bias in our sources which are primarily Athenian. My aim is to supply the Macedonian point of view and to show that their Anti-Athenian attitudes were a justifiable response to Athenian aggression.

The Athenians had a strong interest in controlling the rich natural resources of the Macedonian Kingdom. They needed Macedonian timber, for their fleet, which was the source of their military power.³ Timber was a royal monopoly in Macedonia.⁴ By contrast, the Macedonians never showed any interest in the meager products of the poor Athenian soil.⁵

The friendly relations of Alexander I, who was a *proxenos* and *euergetes* of Athens at the date of the battle of Plataea (8.136), may be connected with timber.⁶ The Athenian fleet that won the victory at Salamis was partly built with Macedonian timber.⁷ Timber continued to be imported from Macedonia during Perdikkas' early reign.⁸ The foundation of Amphipolis in 437 BC provided the Athenians with a source of timber which meant that they were no longer dependant on the Macedonian king for this commodity.⁹ The capture of Amphipolis by the Spartans in 423 forced the Athenians to look to Macedonia again for timber. With Amphipolis in Spartan hands or free, Perdikkas II was once more useful to Athens which was eager to prepare the magnificent fleet that was sent to Sicily in 415 BC. From the years

1. Hermippos, *Phormophoroi*, PCG V 1986, fr. 63 l. 8 : καὶ παρὰ Περδίκκου ψεύδη ναυσὶν πάνυ πολλαῖς.

2. R. MEIGGS, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World*, Oxford 1982, p. 123, 126-129, 424.

3. L. KALLET-MARX, *Money, Expense and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1-5.24*, Berkeley 1993, *passim*.

4. M. FARAGUNA, "Aspetti amministrativi e finanziari della monarchia macedone tra IV e III secolo A.C.", *Athenaeum* 86, 1998, p. 349-95.

5. A. FRENCH, *The Growth of the Athenian Economy*, London 1964, *passim*.

6. M.B. WALLACE, "Early Greek Proxenoï", *Phoenix* 24, 1970, p. 199; C.F. EDSON, "Early Macedonia" in *Ancient Macedonia: Papers Read at the First International Symposium Held at Thessaloniki (26 – 29 August 1968)* (eds. B. Laourdas & Ch. Makaronas), Thessaloniki, 1970, p. 25–26.

7. E. BADIAN, "Herodotus on Alexander I of Macedon. A Study in Some Subtile Silences", in S. HORNBLOWER (ed.), *Greek Historiography*, Oxford 1994, p. 107-130.

8. We learn from Thucydides about his good relations with Athens during these years (1.57.2). Theopompos reports that he received the exiled Histiaeans in Macedonia after special agreements with Athens in 446 BC: *FGrHist* 115 F 387.

9. See Thuc. 4.108.5. For the foundation of Amphipolis see B. H. ISAAC, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest*, Leiden 1986, p. 36-40.

that followed the capture of Amphipolis dates the agreement between Athens and its allies, the kings from Upper Macedonia, and Perdikkas II and his children: Macedonian oars are explicitly mentioned in this treaty (*IG I³ 89*).¹⁰

Timber was exported to Athens also by Archelaos (*IG I³ 117*) during the years that Athens had to rebuild its fleet after the Sicilian disaster. We hear nothing about exports of timber to Athens until the 370s. This may be explained by the defeat of Athens in 404 BC and the endless dynastic struggles in the Macedonian kingdom.¹¹ It was only after the creation of the Second Athenian League that we hear about the Macedonian kings and Athens again. From Xenophon (X. *HG* 6.1.11) and a fragmentary inscription (*IG II/III² 102*) we learn about the alliance of Amyntas III and Athens in the late 370s and the export of timber to the city.¹²

Thus, Athens needed timber from the Macedonian kingdom during periods the city relied on its fleet: during the years Themistocles was building the wooden walls, before the foundation of Amphipolis and after its capture by the enemies of Athens, after the Sicilian campaign in the years of the Ionic war, and also in the 370s, after the creation of the Second Athenian Alliance. There is certainly a close connection between Athenian power, the fleet, timber and the Macedonian kings.

After the retreat of the Persians in 479 BC, both the Athenians and the Macedonian kings were interested in controlling the territories east of the Strymon valley.¹³ These areas could provide timber and precious metals and were under the control of different local tribes, and also of Thasos.¹⁴ With the capture of Eion by Cimon in 476 BC and the establishment of an Athenian base at this place, Athens revealed its ambitions.¹⁵ The revolt of Thasos in 465 BC was related to the control of *emporía* and mines on the Thracian coast.¹⁶ The first Athenian

10. For the different dates proposed for this inscription see D. OGDEN, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: the Hellenistic Dynasties*, London 1999, p. 51 with n. 28.

11. For these years see G. T. GRIFFITH in N. G. L., HAMMOND and G. T. GRIFFITH, *A History of Macedonia*. Vol. II, 550–336 B.C., Oxford 1978, p. 167–200; P. GOUKOFISKY, “Les maisons princières de Macédoine de Perdikkas II à Philippe II”, *Hellènika Symmeikta, Etudes d’archéologie classique* VII, Nancy 1991, p. 43–66; D. A. MARCH, “The Kings of Macedon: 399–369”, *Historia* 54, 1995, p. 257–282.

12. TOD, *GHI* 129, p. 90–92.

13. S. PSOMA, «Το βασίλειο των Μακεδόνων. Νομισματική και Ιστορική Προσέγγιση». *Η Ιστορική Διαδρομή της Νομισματικής Μονάδας στην Ελλάδα*, «Επιστήμης Κοινωνία», Εθνικό Ιδρυμα Ερευνών, Αθήνα 2002, p. 25–46; O. PICARD, «Mines, monnaies et impérialisme: conflits autour du Pangée (478–413 av. J. - C.)» in M. GUIMIER-SORBETS, M. B. HATZOPOULOS and Y. MORIZOT (eds), *Rois, Cités, Nécropoles. Institutions, rites et monuments en Macédoine. Actes des colloques de Nanterre (Décembre 2002) et d’Athènes (Janvier 2004)*, *MEΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ* 45, Athens 2006, p. 269–283.

14. O. PICARD, “Monnayages en Thrace à l’époque achéménide”. *Mécanismes et innovations monétaires dans l’Anatolie achéménide, Numismatique et Histoire, Actes de la Table Ronde Internationale d’Istanbul*, 22–23 mai 1997, Paris 2000, p. 239–252; S. PSOMA, «The “Lete” Coinage Reconsidered”, in P. VAN ALFEN (ed.) *Agoranomia. Studies in Money and Exchange Presented to J. H. Kroll*, New York 2006, p. 78–79.

15. Thuc. 1.98.1: Πρώτον μὲν Ἡίωνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολιορκία εἶλον καὶ ἠνδραπόδισαν, Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγούντος. For Eion see ISAAC, *op. cit.*, p. 60–62.

16. Thuc. 1.100.2: χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστήναι, διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θράκῃ ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου ἃ ἐνέμοντο.

attempt to establish a colony in this area led to a disaster at Drabeskos.¹⁷ When Cimon brought Thasos back to the Athenian League, the Macedonian king gained temporary control of the mints of Pangaion.¹⁸ By the time the king died in 454, the Athenians appear to have gained control of this area, as is revealed by the Athenian Tribute Lists.¹⁹

The foundation of Amphipolis on the Strymon in 437 BC was a continuation of increasing Athenian control over the area, which posed a threat to Macedonian security. Thucydides does not mention the foundation of Amphipolis in his narration of the events that led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war. This omission is very misleading because it suppresses an important motive for Perdikkas' hostility to Athens.²⁰ He mentions the friendly relations of Perdikkas II with Athens at the beginning of his reign that means before the foundation of Amphipolis (1.57.3). Thucydides explains the enmity of the king towards Athens as a result of the alliance of the Athenians with his brother Philip.²¹ Philip controlled the eastern part of the kingdom.²² Thucydides does not give the reason of this alliance but it must have been connected with the foundation of Amphipolis.²³ With a colony at Amphipolis Athens did not need Macedonia for timber and could use the king's brother against the king himself. Perdikkas II knew well his own brother and the cousins from Elimeia.²⁴ Some years later, in 429, when Athens invited its new ally, king Sitalces, to invade Macedonia, the Odrysian brought with him, Amyntas, the son of Philip, to establish him on the Temenid throne.²⁵

Thus, Perdikkas II had two main reasons to consider himself a victim of Athenian aggression: first, the Athenian alliance with his brother and potential rival to the throne and second, the foundation of Amphipolis, with his brother's collaboration. Thucydides also does not mention a crucial event which would have influenced Perdikkas' attitudes towards Athens and changed the balance of power in the North. This was the decision of Athens to establish

17. Thuc. 1.100.3. See B. H. ISAAC, *op. cit.*, p. 24-31.

18. J.H. KAGAN, "The Decadrachm Hoard: Chronology and Consequences", *BAR* 343, 1987, p. 21-28. This hypothesis found further support by the significant remark of Faraguna that Mount Dysoron was on the west bank of the Strymon river: M. FARAGUNA, *op. cit.*, p. 349-95. Faraguna was followed by M. B. HATZOPOULOS (*BullEpigr* 2000, 436: he identified Mount Dysoron with Menoikion and concluded that the silver mints of Alexander I were in fact the Pangaion mints). See also PSOMA and PICARD (supra n. 13). See also ISAAC, *op. cit.*, p. 31-34.

19. The Athenian tribute lists reveal that Berge, a Parian colony situated inland, east of the river Strymon and close to the Mount Pangaion, was a member of the League in 452/1 BC: *IG* I³ 261 IV 29). Argilos, an Andrian colony, immediately to the west of the river Strymon, was a member of the League in 454/3 BC (*IG* I³ 259 IV 22). Strepsa in Upper Chalkidike was a member of the League before 452/1 BC (*IG* I³ 259 face A IV 14).

20. E. BADIAN, "Thucydides and the Arche of Philip", *From Plataea to Potidaea. Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentekontaetia*, Baltimore and London 1993, p. 171-185, p. 125-162.

21. Thuc. 2. 100. 3. M.B. HATZOPOULOS, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*, "ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ" 22, Athens 1996, p. 175-177, 468-469. See also E. BADIAN (n. 20), p. 171-185.

22. See previous note.

23. E. BADIAN (n. 20), p. 171-185.

24. For the collaboration of Derdas of Elimeia with Philip see Thuc. 1.57.3; 1.59.2.

25. For the relations between the kings of Macedonia and the Odrysian kingdom of Thrace see D. LOUKOPOULOU – S. E. PSOMA, "The Thracian Policy of the Temenids", *Acts of the Seventh International Symposium, 14-18 October 2002, Ancient Macedonia VII*, Thessaloniki 2007, p. 143-151 with literary sources and previous bibliography.

a colony at Brea on the eastern shore of the Thermaic gulf, directly opposite Pydna, the kingdom's main harbor.²⁶ This event must be dated between the foundation of Amphipolis in 437 and the revolt of Potidaea in 432.²⁷ It was not only the Macedonian king who was opposed to Athenian policy in the North.²⁸ The Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiaeans that also revolted in 432 BC were also menaced by the Athenian colony at Brea and were thus receptive to Perdikkas' advice to abandon their small coastal cities and turn Olynthus into a major city (Thuc. 1.58.2). This led to the creation of the Chalcidean League, the most significant enemy of Athens in the North.²⁹

Thucydides reports that Perdikkas II often changed sides.³⁰ The Athenians used all sorts of ways to control him: privileges to cities as Methone, the door to Macedonia (*IG* I³ 62), and Aphytis (*IG* I³ 62), opposite the Macedonian coast, and also the ferocious Sitalces, their new Odrysian ally.³¹ Perdikkas II was the most intractable enemy and fickle ally of Athens. It was the king together with the Chalcideans of Thrace who invited Brasidas to the North, an event which led to the loss of Amphipolis and, cancelled the advantage gained by the Athenian success at Sphacteria (Thuc. 4.79.2). From the mid 430s to 414, the Macedonian king did not respect anything but his own instinct for survival. His policy was determined by two factors: (a) the security of his throne and (b) the position of the kingdom in the balance of powers in the North Aegean.

Perdikkas II served his own interests and during his reign these were not to allow Athens to control the North. For Thucydides, he was to blame for the *Poteidaeatika* and the revolts in Thrace (Thuc. 56.1-2; 57.2-5; 58.2). He portrayed the king with the darkest colors and contrasted him the noble Brasidas (4.81.3; 5.11-12.1) and the great innovator, his successor, king Archelaos, who transformed Macedonia, did what all his predecessors have not done before him (Thuc. 2.100.2.), and most important, served Athenian interests.³²

26. See S. PSOMA, «Thuc. 1, 61, 4, Beroia et la nouvelle localisation de Bréa», *REG* 122, 2009, p. 263-280 with previous bibliography.

27. See S. PSOMA (previous note) with previous bibliography. Potidaea was situated, south of Brea but had also other reasons to revolt. From the Athenian tribute lists we learn about the increase of the tribute of Potidaea. Thucydides mentions the *ultimatum* concerning the Southern wall and the annual *epidamiourgoi* from its mother city: Thuc. 1.56.2. Cf. A.W. GOMME, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides I*, Oxford 1945, p. 199-200.

28. For the cities that revolted in 432 BC see M. ZÄHRNT, *Olynth und die Chalkidier. Untersuchungen zur Staatenbildung auf der Chalkidischen Halbinsel im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, "Vestigia" 14, Munich 1971, 49-57; S. PSOMA, *Olynthe et les Chalcidiens de Thrace. Etudes de numismatique et d'histoire*, Paris 2001, 203-209.

29. For the foundation of the League sometime after 432 BC see S. PSOMA, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 209-221. For the relations of the League with the Macedonian kings see S. PSOMA, «The Kingdom of Macedonia and the Chalcidic League», in R. LANE FOX (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Ancient Macedon. Studies in the Archaeology and History of Ancient Macedon, 650 B.C. – 300 A.D.*, Leiden 2011, p. 113-135.

30. Thuc. 1.57.2; 1.61.3; 1.61.4; 1.62.2; 2.29.6; 4.79.2; 4.128.5; 5.83.4; 6.7.4; 7.9. See S. PSOMA, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 203 n. 122.

31. For the kingdom of Macedonia and the Odrysians see L. D. LOUKOPOULOU – S. E. PSOMA (n. 25), p. 143-151 with previous bibliography.

32. See *IG* I³ 117.

Athenian and Macedonian interests joined again in the last years of the reign of Amyntas III, after the foundation of the Second Athenian League, when the kingdom enjoyed some external and internal stability.³³ Timber was once more involved. Aeschines claims that Amyntas III recognized Athenian rights to Amphipolis at the Peace Conference of summer 371 (Aesch. 2.32) in Sparta.³⁴ In reality, all the peace did was to recognize the principle that the Greek cities should possess the territory that belonged to them.³⁵ Xenophon (*Hell* 6.3.18.1 to 4) and Ephorus (*ap.* Diodorus: 15.38.2.1 to 6), who report about the peace, do not mention any Athenian claims on Amphipolis or the Thracian Chersonnese. What Aeschines said to Philip II in 346 about the recognition by his father, king Amyntas, of Athenian rights to Amphipolis, has to be set against the rhetoric background of the speech.³⁶ The Athenian rights to Amphipolis derived from the clause “to have its own land” of the peace.³⁷ Athens had these plans certainly in mind when it sent the Athenian general Iphicrates to the North “ἐπὶ κατασκοπῇ τῶν πραγμάτων” in 369 BC.³⁸ Iphicrates’ presence in this area had immediate consequences: the Athenian general who was adopted by Amyntas III during the years he served his brother in law Kotys I, saved the line of Amyntas III and Eurydice against the pretender Pausanias who had invaded Macedonia from the East (Aesch. 2.28-29).³⁹

The alliance with Athens did not last. The appearance of a new power, Thebes, changed the balance of power. Alexander II and Ptolemy of Aloros who succeeded him, became allies of Thebes.⁴⁰ Macedonia under the guidance of Thebes opposed Athenian plans for the recapture of Amphipolis. From 368 to 365 BC all efforts of Iphicrates in this direction failed as a result of this strong Anti-Athenian alliance of Thebes that included the kingdom of Macedonia, Amphipolis and the Chalcidean League.⁴¹

33. For the difficult reign of Amyntas III see M. ZÄHRNT, “Amyntas III.: Fall und Aufstieg eines Makedonenkönigs“, *Hermes* 134, 2006, p. 127-141; M. ZÄHRNT, “Amyntas III. und die griechischen Mächte“, *Ancient Macedonia* VII, Thessaloniki 2007, p. 239-251. For the kings of Macedon during this period of instability see D. A. MARCH, “The Kings of Macedon: 399–369“, *Historia* 54, 1995, p. 257–282.

34. For this Peace Conference see M. JEHNE, *Koine Eirene. Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.*, “Hermes Einzelschriften“ 63, Stuttgart 1994, p. 65.

35. M. JEHNE, “Die Anerkennung der athenischen Besitzansprüche auf Amphipolis und die Chersones: Zu den Implikationen der Territorialklausel ἔχειν τὴν ἑαυτῶν (χώραν) in Verträgen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.”, *Historia* 41. 3, 1992, p. 272-282.

36. E.M. HARRIS, *Aeschines and Athenian Politics*, New York 1995, p. 64.

37. M. JEHNE (n. 35), p. 272-282.

38. For the most discussed delay of the Athenians to send troops to the North see M.B. HATZOPOULOS, “Ἡ ὁμηγεῖα τοῦ Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμύντα στὴ Θήβα”, *Archaiognosia* 4, 1985/1986, p. 37-57 with previous bibliography.

39. M.B. HATZOPOULOS (n. 38), p. 37-57; A. AYMARD, “Philippe II de Macédoine otage à Thèbes”, *REA* 56, 1954, p. 15-36.

40. See previous note and also S. PSOMA (n. 29), Leiden 2011, p. 126; R. LANE FOX, “The 360s”, in R. LANE FOX (ed.), *Brill’s Companion to Ancient Macedon, Studies in the Archaeology and History of Ancient Macedon, 650 B.C. – 300 A.D.*, p. 259-60.

41. S. PSOMA, *op. cit.*, 2011 (n. 29), p. 124-129 ; R. LANE FOX, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

This alliance ended with the assassination of Ptolemy and the accession of Perdikkas III. The new king had several reasons for joining Athens.⁴² By delivering the Amphipolitan hostages to Iphicrates, he inaugurated his new foreign policy.⁴³ Iphicrates' incapacity to take advantage of the hostages brought about his replacement by Timotheus.⁴⁴ Perdikkas III collaborated with Timotheus, and they campaigned together against Olynthus.⁴⁵ To force Olynthus into submission, they captured Torone and Potidaea late in 364/3.⁴⁶

The alliance of Perdikkas III with Timotheus was short-lived. Perdikkas may have felt threatened by Athenian successes and feared the extension of Athenian power in the North. He may have also been concerned about the reaction of the Chalcidean League and Thebes.⁴⁷ Once again an Athenian threat to Macedonian territory was responsible of the anti-Athenian attitude of the king. Timotheus captured the two coastal cities of Pieria after the end of 364/3 BC (Din. *Dem.* 14.4-6):⁴⁸ Methone, the Eretrian colony, and Pydna, a Macedonian city which gained autonomy in the early part of the IVth century and was refounded by Amyntas III.⁴⁹ Timotheus appears to have established garrisons in both.⁵⁰ Both cities posed a threat to Macedonian security because they could serve as Athenian bases to launch invasions of Macedonia.⁵¹ The kingdom had experienced Athenian attacks on Pydna under Perdikkas II at the very beginning of the *Poteidaiaiika* (Thuc. 1.61.3). Perdikkas III certainly knew about Methone's ties with

42. For full analysis see S. PSOMA (n. 29), p. 128-9. See also S. PSOMA (n. 28), p. 235-236 ; M.B. HATZOPOULOS, "La Béotie et la Macédoine à l'époque de l'hégémonie thébaine: le point de vue macédonien", *La Béotie antique*, Lyon-Saint-Etienne 1985, p. 254 et 255 with n. 83; S. DUSANIC, "Plato's Academy and Timotheus' Policy, 365-359 BC", *Chiron* 10, 1980, p. 111-121; I. S. PAPASTAVRU, *Amphipolis. Geschichte und Prosopographie*, Klio, Bht 37, neue Folge, Hft. 24, Leipzig 1936, p. 28.

43. S. PSOMA (n. 29), p. 127; J. HESKEL, *The North Aegean Wars, 371-360 B.C.*, Stuttgart 1996, p. 28-29.

44. To avoid prosecution for his failure, Iphicrates did not return to Athens and retired to the court of the Odrysian king Cotys. Cotys was Iphicrates' brother in law: Dem. 23.129 and J. K. DAVIES, *Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 BC*, Oxford 1971, p. 249. Iphicrates fled there to avoid prosecution at Athens, the fate of most unsuccessful generals: E.M. HARRIS, "Iphicrates at the Court of Cotys", *AJPh* 110, 1989, p. 264-271.

45. For the collaboration between Timotheos and Perdikkas: Dem. 2.14; Polyaen. 3.10.14; 4.10.2.

46. Isocr. 15. 113; Polyaen. 3.10.15 (Torone); Dem. S. 15. 81. 6 (Torone and Potidaea). During this same year Alcimachus failed to capture Amphipolis (Schol. in Aeschin. 2.31.17 to 21), which was helped also by local Thracian tribes: I. S. PAPASTAVRU, *Amphipolis. Geschichte und Prosopographie*, Leipzig 1936, p. 29.

47. I. S. PAPASTAVRU (n. 46), p. 29; M.B. HATZOPOULOS (n. 42), p. 256.

48. See previous note.

49. *Schol. ad Dem.* 1.1.5. See CHR. HABICHT, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*. 2nd ed. "ZETEMATA". Monographien zur klassischen Altertumswissenschaft 14, München p. 11-12; M.B. HATZOPOULOS (n. 42), p. 253 n. 66; M.B. HATZOPOULOS (n. 21), p. 471 with n. 2. For Pydna and Amyntas III see PSOMA in PSOMA ET AL. 2008, p. 205-206.

50. Evidence is brought by the Athenian types of the second series of the bronze coinage of Pydna : P. TSELEKAS, "The Coinage of Pydna", *NC* 1996, p. 11-32.

51. S. PSOMA (n. 29), p. 128-129.

Athens during the Peloponnesian war when Methone served as an Athenian base for invasions of Macedonia.⁵² It was at Methone that arrived the pretender Argaios with Athenian troops when Perdikkas III died (D. S. 16.2 ff).

Timotheus' alliance with Menelaos of Pelagonia, a northern neighbor, may have also troubled Perdikkas (*IG* II/III² 110). Athens wished to impose its rule in the North and for this purpose, the city was ready to use any means and do not care that aspects of its policy may have offended its ally, the Macedonian king. This is also relevant to the fact that after the end of the alliance with Perdikkas III, the Athenians searched for other allies in this area, this time among the enemies of Macedonia. Pausanias, the Macedonian prince in exile at Kalindoia was one of them.⁵³ The alliance with Menelaos the Pelagonian was already noticed.

Perdikkas III responded to Athenian aggressions by supporting his new allies, the Chalcidean League and Amphipolis. Military operations against Olynthus seem to have continued for sometime and this was the reason that Macedonian support was needed for the defense of Amphipolis.⁵⁴ A Macedonian garrison most probably under the command of the king's younger brother Philip, who was trained in Thebes, strengthened the defenses of the city (Aesch. 2.29).⁵⁵ All Athenian efforts to capture Amphipolis were unsuccessful because of the coalition of Perdikkas III, Amphipolis and the Chalcidean league, the enemy *par excellence* of Athens in the North.⁵⁶ Like the Macedonian kings, the league was a member of the Second Athenian League but changed sides after the declaration of Athenian rights to Amphipolis.⁵⁷ For Athens, it was difficult to deal with the League. Opposing Athens was the policy of the federal government that did not fear, as the Macedonian king, the various pretenders, another instrument of Athenian policy against the kings of Macedonia.

All enemies of Macedonia revealed their intentions to destroy the kingdom after Perdikkas III and 4000 Macedonians were killed in battle at the Illyrian front in 360/359 BC.⁵⁸ Among those most eager to take control of Macedonia was Athens. The city tried to gain what was lost on the battle field and provided the pretender Argaios with Athenian troops (D.S. 16.2.6).⁵⁹ After Argaios failed to persuade the inhabitants of Aegae to receive him as king

52. Thuc. 6.7.3. Cf. *IG* I³ 62.

53. Ephipp. *apud* Ath. 8.346ff. See S. DUSANIC, "Athens, Crete and the Aegean after 366 BC", *Talanta* 12, 1980, p. 7-29. *Contra* E. VOUTYRAS and K. SISMANIDIS, "Δικαιοπολιτών συναλλαγαι. Μια νέα επιγραφή από την Δίκαια, αποικία της Εφέτριας", *Ancient Macedonia* VII, Thessaloniki 2007, p. 253-274.

54. For Timotheus' presence in the North see S. Psoma (n. 29), p. 127-32.

55. Philip was a hostage in Thebes between 369 and 367 BC: A. AYMARD (n. 39), p. 23-26. For literary sources and analysis see M.B. HATZOPOULOS (n. 21); S. PSOMA (n. 28), p. 240 with n. 432.

56. S. PSOMA (n. 29) p. 131.

57. *IG* II/III² 43 face B coll. I-II 5-6. For the alliance of Amyntas III and Athens see *IG* II/III² 102.

58. D. S. 16.2.4.

59. For Argaios see also J. HESKEL, "Philip II and Argaios", in R. W. WALLACE & E. M. HARRIS, *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman history, 360-146 B.C. in honor of E. Badian* Oklahoma 1996, p. 38-51; LANE FOX (n. 40), p. 266

the new king, Philip II, had no trouble isolating his army and killing the pretender (D.S. 16.3.5-6).⁶⁰ However, he sent the Athenian troops back and withdrew the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis to gain time with Athens (D. S. 16.3.3). Philip needed also a thorough strategic plan to deal with Athens, who kept on claiming Amphipolis and the Thracian Chersonnese.

The fate of Argaios and some years later also of his brother Pausanias kept potential pretenders quiet for sometime.⁶¹ Macedonia had many declared enemies under Philip II that Athens might have tried to form alliances with: the Illyrians, the Paeonians and the Odrysians.⁶² But there were other potential enemies also: the kingdoms of Upper Macedonia, the Chalcidean League, the tyrants of Pherai, already Athens' allies. Philip II sent his armed forces more than once against the Illyrians, the Paeonians, the Odrysians and the tyrants of Pherai.⁶³ With the Chalcidean League and most of the cities of Thrace, he used gifts, his diplomatic skills, and his army, when that was needed. He treated Athens not differently from other threats to his throne.

Demosthenes constantly accuses Philip for aggression but Philip's next move were mainly defensive aiming at countering Athenian aggression in the North. After the capture of Amphipolis in 357/6 BC, it was Athens who declared war on Philip (D. S. 16. 8. 2; Polyae. 4. 2. 17). To protect the security of his kingdom, Philip took over Pydna (D.S. 16.8.3) and became an ally of the Chalcideans of Thrace who received from him the border area of Anthemous (Dem. 6.20; Liban. *Hypoth. Ol.* 1) and later Potidaea (D. S. 16. 8. 3, 5).⁶⁴ Far from being an aggressor, Philip responded to the appeal of the Thasian colony at Krenides which was probably threatened by the Odrysian king Ketriporis. He established there Macedonian settlers and renamed the city Philippi (D.S. 16.8.6). Ketriporis turned to Athens and other enemies of Macedonia: Krenides was a key point in his alliance with Athens, Grabos of Illyria and Lypeios of Paoenia, in the following year (D. 22.3; cf. *IG II/III*² 127). Philip II defeated each of the three kings in term.⁶⁵

Methone, which served twice as an Athenian base for attacks on the kingdom (Thuc. 6.7.1; D.S. 16.3.5) was destroyed in 354 BC (D.S. 16.31.6). Even though Philip had given extensive territories to the Chalcidean League, the Chalcideans sent an embassy to the Athenians, his enemies, which led to a treaty of friendship.⁶⁶ Philip naturally considered this an act of disloyalty and in 352/1 BC, on his return from Thrace made a demonstration against the Chalcideans (D. 4.17). In 349 BC Philip asked the Chalcideans to surrender his two half brothers, who might

60. See E. ANSON, "Philip II, Amyntas Perdiccas, and Macedonian Royal Succession", *Historia* 58, 2009, p. 276-86. He explains that Philip II became king after the death of his brother and became also the tutor (*prostates*) of his nephew.

61. For these two brothers see Theop. *FGrHist* 115 F 29 and the excellent remarks of P. GOUKOFISKY [n. 11], p. 55-59 for this fragment.

62. D. S. 16.2.6. See also *IG II/III*² 127.

63. See N. G. L., HAMMOND and G. T. GRIFFITH (n. 11), p. 216-328.

64. For Pydna see E. M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 44 with previous bibliography. For the Chalcidean League : M. ZÄHRNT (n. 28), p. 104-111; S. PSOMA (n. 28), p. 240-249.

65. See *supra* n. 63.

66. N. G. L., HAMMOND and G. T. GRIFFITH (n. 11), p. 298.

have become pretenders to the throne, given their recent friendship with Athens.⁶⁷ Philip had good reason to test their loyalty. Philip invaded the territories of the Chalcideans and picked off the cities members of the League. The Athenians sent help twice but by the end of the summer of 348 BC the king sacked Olynthus and dissolved the Chalcidean League.⁶⁸

Athens shocked by the fate of Olynthus tried to form a Panhellenic coalition against Philip (Aesch. 2.79; D. 19.10). The Greeks were too divided at the time by the Third Sacred War and by other conflicts to unite in a common effort against him.⁶⁹ Despite Athenian support for Olynthus, Philip bore no grudge against the Athenians. He repeatedly offered to make peace with them after the fall of Olynthus. His intent was to deprive Kersebleptes, the remaining king of Thrace of Athenian support during his upcoming invasion of the eastern part of the Odrysian kingdom. In exchange Philip offered the Athenians the security of their possessions in the Thracian Chersonese. His settlement was a generous one in view of previous Athenian attempts to destabilize his kingdom. With the Peace of Philocrates Athens abandoned the claims on Amphipolis but could retain the Thracian Chersonese, except for Kardias.⁷⁰ The alliance was also guaranteeing safety of the seas and combined action against piracy.⁷¹

The ones who were most responsible for disrupting the peace of Philocrates were Demosthenes and Hegesippus.⁷² When the Athenians complained about the settlement of 346, Philip offered to revise the terms of the treaty and to settle existing disputes.⁷³ In 343, Hegesippus and others were sent by the Athenians to negotiate with Philip. On their return, Hegesippus completely distorted Philip's proposals and aroused Athenian suspicions about his intentions ([D.] 7).⁷⁴ Troubles arose in the Chersonese when the Athenians sent clerouchs to the area.⁷⁵ Philip responded to Athenian aggression by sending troops to support Kardias.⁷⁶ The

67. See J. R. ELLIS, "The Step-brothers of Philip II", *Historia* 22, 1973, p. 350-354.

68. For literary sources and previous bibliography see M. ZÄHRNT (n. 28), p. 104-111 ; S. PSOMA (n. 28); S. PSOMA (n. 29), p. 134.

69. E.M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 54.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 71: because Halos and Phocis were not members of the *synedrion* of the allies of Athens, they were not included in the Peace.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 134-137 with previous bibliography, literary sources and discussion.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 108, 110, 112.

73. [Dem.] 7.24-29

74. E.M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 112-113 with n. 12.

75. Dem. 8 *hypoth.*

76. Kardias, on the Isthmos of the peninsula, was a particular case that escaped Athenian control in the fourth century BC because of its close ties with the Odrysian royal family (Dem. 23.181). It was at Kardias that Charidemus met king Kotys in 365/4. It was the Kardians, Kersebleptes' allies, that executed Miltokythes, the ally of the Athenians that Demosthenes praised for his fidelity. (Dem. 23. 169-170). For Demosthenes (23.175), the Kardians were the Athenian enemies *par excellence*.

Athenian general Diopieithes then exacerbated the situation by raiding Macedonian territory in Thrace in early 341 BC.⁷⁷ This led to increased hostilities and the outbreak of war in the following year.

Philip who had already deposed Kersebleptes in 346 BC, because he feared the well known Athenian practice of using coastal cities as bases for attacks, he began the sieges of Perinthos and Byzantion.⁷⁸ To put pressure on Athens, he captured Athenian ships that brought corn to the city.⁷⁹ War was then declared on Philip by Athens who received money and help from Chios, Kos and Rhodes.⁸⁰

Demosthenes accuses Philip of plotting with Aeschines to stir up the Fourth Sacred War in order to give him an excuse to enter central Greece and attack Athens (D. 18.150). There is no reason to accept Demosthenes' charges. The fourth sacred war broke out in Philip's absence when he was far away in Scythia where he could not take advantage of the situation.⁸¹ The conflict erupted because of Theban resentments towards Athens dating back to Athenian support for Phokis during the Third Sacred War.⁸² Theban intrigues with the Lokrians of Amphissa disrupted Philip's settlement in 346 and set the Thessalians against the Thebans and the Lokrians.⁸³ This conflict was not in Philip's interest because it divided two of his most valuable allies, the Thessalians and the Thebans.⁸⁴ Demosthenes took advantage of the situation to get the Thebans to conclude an alliance with Athens.⁸⁵ Philip's intervention in Central Greece did not result of deliberate aggression but was forced upon him by Athenian policy.⁸⁶ Even after his victory at Chaeronea, Philip treated the Athenians generously.⁸⁷ He did compel them to dissolve the Second Athenian Confederacy but the Confederacy was a shadow of its former self.⁸⁸ On the other hand, he may have returned Oropos to Athens.⁸⁹

77. The citizens of Kardias, precious allies of Philip II in this area, refused to receive the Athenians and claimed that they lived in their own land (Dem. 12.11; 19.174) in this area (8.58, 64, 66; 9.35; 10.18, 19, 60, 65, 68) which was excluded from all agreements between Philip and Athens with them (Dem. *Pax* 25.3; 7.41; 7.39.5; Lib., *ArgD* 8.1 to 8.3). We learn from a letter of Philip II to the city of Athens that the clerouchs made a war against him: Dem. 12.16. For the clerouchs that Athens sent with Diopieithes in Kardias see Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 114. Chares was in the area this same year (341/340 BC): *IG* II/III² 1628. For literary sources, bibliography and discussion see E.M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 119 with n. 28.

78. For Perinthos see D. S. 16.74.2. Philip seized the city with thirty thousand soldiers (D. S. 74.2-76.4). Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 162. The siege of Byzantion began in 341/340: Diod. Sic. 16.76.3; 77. 2.

79. Dem. 18.73; Theopomp. *FGrHist* 115 F 292; Philoch. *FGrHist* 328 F 162. E.M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 124.

80. D.S. 16.77.2.

81. Aeschin. 3.128; Justin 9.2.1-16.

82. E.M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 89-90, 126-128 with literary sources and discussion.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 126-130 with literary sources, bibliography and discussion.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 129-30.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 132-133.

86. Aeschin. 3.123-9.

87. Diod. Sic. 16.87.3; Just. 9.4.4-5. Cf. [Demad.] 9.

88. Paus. 1.25.3.

89. Paus. 1.34.1; Sch. *ad* Dem. 18.99.

To conclude. All Anti Athenian attitudes of the Temenids from Alexander I to Perdikkas III may be explained by the interest of Athens to control Macedonian natural resources, mainly timber. For Athens it was a matter of power and for the Temenids before Philip II, of survival. All Philip II wanted from the Athenians was “to maintain their friendship and not to allow them to strengthen their position to the point where they could challenge Macedonian power.”⁹⁰



Fig. 1 : Map of Macedonia and its neighbours, ca. 350 BC.

90. E.M. HARRIS (n. 36), p. 134.

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