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## THĒTES EPIBATAI IN FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS\*

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*Résumé.* – Ces dernières années, la vision traditionnelle des *thētes* agissant comme *epibatai* dans la flotte athénienne au V<sup>e</sup> siècle avant J.-C. a été fortement contestée par différents auteurs. Cette question est abordée ici en réexaminant les sources anciennes, ainsi que d’autres facteurs tels que la démographie (en particulier en ce qui concerne les victimes de la guerre du Péloponnèse) et les formes de recrutement. Il est suggéré, avec de nouveaux arguments, que certains des membres de la classe censitaire des *thētes* auraient pu habituellement servir d’hoplites dans la marine athénienne du V<sup>e</sup> siècle, mais que les pénuries de main-d’œuvre pendant la guerre du Péloponnèse pourraient avoir changé la façon dont les *epibatai* ont été recrutés.

*Abstract.* – In recent years the traditional view of *thētes* acting as *epibatai* in the Athenian fleet in fifth century BC has been strongly challenged by different authors. This issue is broached here by re-examining the ancient sources, as well as other factors like demography (especially in relation to the casualties of the Peloponnesian War) and forms of conscription. Deploying new arguments, it is suggested that some of the members of the census class of *thētes* might have customarily served as hoplites in the fifth-century Athenian navy, but that manpower shortages during the Peloponnesian War might have modified the way in which *epibatai* were conscripted.

*Mots-clés.* – *Thētikon*, *epibatai*, hoplites, changements démographiques, V<sup>e</sup> siècle, Athènes.

*Keywords.* – *Thētikon*, *epibatai*, hoplites, demographic changes, fifth century Athens.

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The idea that the *epibatai* in the fleet were *thētes* was coined by Busolt and endorsed by Gomme and, subsequently, by authors such as Ste. Croix, Hornblower and van Wees, among others.<sup>1</sup> Several of these authors assumed that the state provided the *thētes* with hoplite weapons,<sup>2</sup> an assumption criticised by van Wees<sup>3</sup> who, in any case, included many *thētes* in the traditional ‘hoplite census’, namely, those who owned between 3.6 ha (40 *plethra*) and 5.4 ha (60 *plethra*) of land.<sup>4</sup>

The theory that the *thētes* were *epibatai* was, however, contested by Jordan in 1975, deploying several arguments that have recently gained momentum in various studies.<sup>5</sup> In this work, the arguments for and against the *thētes epibatai* theory, as set out by different authors in

1. G. BUSOLT, H. SWOBODA, *Griechische Staatskunde*, München 1926, p. 575 (with n. 1) and 1206; A.W. GOMME, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. II. Books II-III, Oxford 1956, p. 42, 80, 271, 367, 404, 407-408; G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, *Athenian Democratic Origins and Other Essays*, Oxford 2004, p. 21; H. VAN WEES, «The Myth of the Middle-Class Army: Military and Social Status in Ancient Athens» in T. BEKKER-NIELSEN, L. HANNESTAD eds., *War as a Cultural and Social Force: Essays on Warfare in Antiquity*, Copenhagen 2001, p. 59; H. VAN WEES, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities*, London 2004, p. 210; H. VAN WEES, «Mass and Elite in Solon’s Athens: The Property Classes Revisited» in J. BLOK, A.P.M.H. LARDINOIS eds., *Solon of Athens*, Leiden 2006, p. 371; S. HORNBLOWER, *A Commentary on Thucydides, III: Books 5.25–8.109*, Oxford-New York 2008, p. 815-816.

2. M.H. HANSEN, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, Oxford 1991, p. 45; STE. CROIX, *Athenian...*, *op. cit.* n. 1, 21; W.T. LOOMIS, *Wages, Welfare Costs and Inflation in Classical Athens*, Ann Arbor 1998, p. 59.

3. H. VAN WEES, «Mass and Elite...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 373.

4. H. VAN WEES, «The Myth...», *op. cit.* n. 1; «Mass and Elite...» *op. cit.* n. 1; H. VAN WEES, «Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development» in D. KAGAN, G.F. VIGGIANO eds., *Men of Bronze. Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, Princeton-Oxford 2013, p. 122-255 (12 ha as a *zeugites*, at a minimum); H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers in Archaic Athens» in A. DUPLOUY, R.W. BROCK eds., *Defining Citizenship in Archaic Greece*, Oxford 2018 (Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2018. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198817192.001.0001) p. 27 (13.8 ha or 7,590 dr.). I would like to thank Prof. van Wees for providing me with a copy of this chapter. For the widespread existence of middling farmers with properties of between 40 and 60 *plethra* (3.6 and 5.4 ha) in classical times: V.N. ANDREYEV, «Some Aspects of Agrarian Conditions in Attica in the Fifth to Third Centuries B.C.», *Eirene* 12, 1974, p. 14-16; A. BURFORD, *Land and Labor in the Greek World*, Baltimore 1993, p. 67-72; M.H. JAMESON, «Class in the Ancient Greek Countryside» in P. DOUKELLIS, L. MENDONI eds., *Structures rurales et sociétés antiques*, Paris 1994, p. 59; V.D. HANSON, *The Other Greeks: The Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization*, New York 1995, p. 181-201; H. VAN WEES, «The Myth...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 51 with n. 41; P. HALSTEAD, *Two Oxen Ahead. Pre-Mechanized Farming in the Mediterranean*, Malden MA 2014, p. 61. For criticism of van Wees’ theory and measures for *zeugitai*: M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGU, «Athenian *Zeugitai* and the Solonian Census Classes: New Reflections and Perspectives», *Historia* 59, 2010, p. 257-281; M. VALDÉS, «The social and cultural background of hoplite development in Archaic Athens: peasants, debts, *zeugitai* and *Hoplēthes*», *Historia* 68, 2019, p. 398; see *infra* n. 55 ; also: M. VALDÉS, «*Zeugitai* in Fifth-Century Athens: Social and Economic Qualification from Cleisthenes to the End of the Peloponnesian War», *Pnyx* 1, 2022, p. 45-78.

5. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1975, p. 195-203. This theory has recently been recuperated by authors like T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status and Combat Reality of Classical Greek *epibatai*», *Historia* 66, 2017, p. 45-64; T. OKADA, «*Zeugitai* and hoplites: A military dimension of the Solon’s property classes revisited», *Japan Studies in Classical Antiquity* 3, 2017, p. 17-37; T. OKADA, «Some notes on IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032 and the crews of Athenian triremes in the fifth century BCE» in F. BEUTLER, TH. PANTZER eds., *Sprachen – Schriftkulturen – Identitäten der Antike*, Vienna 2018. See also D. PRITCHARD, «The Symbiosis between Democracy and War: The case of ancient Athens» in D.M. Pritchard ed, *War, Democracy and Culture in Classical*, Cambridge-New York 2010, p. 24-25; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy at War*, Cambridge 2019, p. 40-43.

light of an analysis of the sources, will be discussed in order to attempt to gain further insights into this subject, taking into account, among other factors, the demographic changes in Athens during the fifth century.<sup>6</sup>

### 1. – THE EPIBATAI AS HOPLITES WITH HIGH SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

The main arguments underpinning the theory that the *epibatai* were of high socioeconomic or hoplite status are based on the fact that in several passages the *epibatai* are called ‘hoplites’ and were, therefore, considered as such.<sup>7</sup> Several authors have pointed out that the *epibatai* in the inscription IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032—of an uncertain date, although apparently later than 413-411<sup>8</sup>—are mentioned just after the trierarchs and before the officers,<sup>9</sup> and, furthermore, several of them own slaves.<sup>10</sup> Democleides also seemed to have been of good social standing, since his stele—c. 400—where he appears on the bow of a ship, represented, perhaps, as an *epibates*, illustrates the wealth of his family.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, Andocides, who was also from a well-off family, was reproached at that time in a speech, attributed to Lysias, for not having served as

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6. All dates are BC unless stated otherwise.

7. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 197-198. See, e.g., Thuc. II, 23; II, 69, 2; II, 102; III, 91, 1 (in comparison with III, 95, 2); probably also in Thuc. IV, 101, 3-4. Xen., *Hellenica*, IV, 8, 25-28 (use of the *epibatai* as regular hoplites in hoplite warfare in 390, with the *epibatai* and the hoplites seemingly being interchangeable). For further sources, see: M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide’s Narrative on Naval Warfare: Epibatai, Military Theory, Ideology» in G. LEE, H. WHITTAKER, G. WRIGHTSON eds., *Ancient Warfare: Introducing Current Research*, vol. 1, Newcastle upon Tyne 2015, p. 210-228; T. HERZOGENTRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5.

8. D.R. LAING, *A New Interpretation of the Athenian Naval Catalogue, IG II 2, 1951*, Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Cincinnati 1965, p. 107-119 suggests Aegospotami. Objections in A.J. GRAHAM, «Thucydides 7.13.2 and the Crews of Athenian Triremes: An Addendum.», *TAPhA* 128, 1998, p. 108 who dated it to 412, and G. BAKEWELL, «Trierarchs’ Records and The Athenian Naval Catalogue (Ig I3 1032)» in E.A. MACKAY ed, *Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World*, Leiden-Boston 2008, p. 143 who is more inclined to believe that it was in about 400. For his part, T. OKADA, «Some notes...», *op. cit.* n. 5, contends that it was earlier than 413-411.

9. The officials were, according to B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 198, experienced *thētes*. For *hypēresia* as officials: J.S. MORRISON, *Hypēresia in Naval Contexts in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.*, *JHS* 104, 1984, p. 48-59; V. GABRIELSEN, *Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations*, Baltimore 1994, p. 106; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 82-83. *Contra*: B. JORDAN, «The Crews of Athenian Triremes», *AC* 69, p. 81-101; B. JORDAN, «Slaves among the Frogs», *AC* 72, 2003, p. 41-53 (*hypēresia* as public slaves).

10. G. BAKEWELL, «Trierarchs’ Records...», *op. cit.* n. 8, p. 151; T. OKADA, «Some notes...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 5.

11. Athens National Archaeological Museum, inv. No 751. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 198; T. OKADA, «Zeugitai and hoplites...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 16; *Id.*, «Some notes...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 6; T. HERZOGENTRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 46-47; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 43.

a knight or hoplite or a trierarch or *epibates*.<sup>12</sup> Anyway, what is interesting in this text is that service as a hoplite is differentiated from that as an *epibates*, which seems to indicate that there was a clear distinction between the two.<sup>13</sup>

The *epibatai* can be classified as *beltistoi*, in Thucydides, for example, in Aetolia during the Peloponnesian War (426).<sup>14</sup> Aristotle also points out that the *epibatai* are free men forming part of the infantry, who control and command crews.<sup>15</sup> Several authors have also stressed that in other states the *epibatai* were apparently always citizens—as in Athens—and reputed or highly valued.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the decree of Themistocles, which is a very controversial document,<sup>17</sup> has been mentioned in this context. Should this be considered as a copy of a decree of 480, or at least a document that might reflect, to a certain degree, the prevailing situation, it would provide interesting information on the *epibatai* at the time, in this case there being ten per ship, although Plutarch mentions 14.<sup>18</sup> According to the decree, the *epibatai*, aged between 20 and 30, were chosen from the list (*katalogos*) (lin. 23-25). They are cited after the trierarchs, as in the case of the aforementioned decree of the end of the fifth century (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032*). However, even if some of the data in the document can be traced back to that period, which is controversial, the exceptional nature of the situation, with the embarkation of all citizens (*pandēmei*),<sup>19</sup> makes theirs an atypical case that, as such, is worthy of further attention.

12. Lysias, VI, *Against Andocides*, 46. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 198.

13. In the main, the *epibatai* must be distinguished from other (generally more numerous) contingents of soldiers (regular hoplites) who were embarked on ships to take part in land fighting at the destination. If these were very numerous, specific ships could be chartered to transport them (*hoplitagotai, stratiotides*): V. GABRIELSEN, *Financing...*, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 106-107; J.S. MORRISON *et al.*, *The Athenian Trireme: The History and Reconstruction of an Ancient Greek Warship*, Cambridge 2000 [1986], p. 226-227. This distinction between *epibatai* and “regular hoplites” seems to have been drawn very clear in the expedition to Sicily, where there were 1,500 ordinary hoplites (*ek katalogou*) and the 700 *epibatai thētes* (600 in other versions): see n. 23. Also distinguished in *IG I<sup>3</sup> 60* (430) in which five *epibatai* and 40 hoplites are listed for each ship. See M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide's...», *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 211.

14. Thuc. III, 95, 2; III, 98, 4 (120 of the 300 *epibatai* perished in Aetolia). See B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 197; T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status ...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 54-55.

15. Arist. Politics, VII, 1327b: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν [10] ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζυόντων ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας. In a passage in which he despises sea power, Plato does not mention the *epibatai* but the pilots, the captain and the rowers: Plato, *Leges*, IV, 707a. Moreover, he calls the *epibatai* “*beltistoi*” in IV, 706d, but this passage is ambiguous, because further on he also vilifies them. See also Plato, *Symposium*, 197e (λόγῳ κυβερνήτης, ἐπιβάτης, παραστάτης τε καὶ σωτῆρ ἄριστος). See T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 43-44.

16. Hdt. VI, 15; Thuc. I, 55, 1; Xen., *Hellenica*, I, 1, 28-30; B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 199; T. OKADA, «Some notes...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 6.

17. *SEG* 22.274; *ML* 23. M.H. JAMESON, «A decree of Themistokles from Troizen», *Hesperia* 29, 1960, p. 198-223; *Id.*, «The provisions for mobilization in the decree of Themistokles», *Historia* 12, 1963, p. 385-404. Its authenticity has been ruled out by most of the authors: M. JOHANSSON, «The Inscription from Troizen: A Decree of Themistocles?», *ZPE* 137, 2001, p. 69-92 (with bibliography). It was initially accepted by N.G.L. HAMMOND, «The Manning of the Fleet in the Decree of Themistokles», *Phoenix* 40, 1986, p. 143-148.

18. Plutarch, *Themistocles*, XIV, 2. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 194-195, is of the mind that this number should be accepted.

19. Hdt. VIII, 144, 3.



Before going on to consider the arguments in favour of the *thētes*' service as *epibatai*, it should be noted that there is one aspect on which there is a general consensus: the *epibatai* in Athens, at least in the fifth century, were always Athenian citizens.<sup>20</sup> At any rate, during the Peloponnesian War—and as was also apparently the case in Salamis, according to the decree of Themistocles—each ship embarked ten *epibatai*, but there is evidence that this number could vary.<sup>21</sup> And although it is not clear how the *epibatai* were recruited, it seems that service in the fleet was voluntary, with some passages indicating that this was specifically the case for the *epibatai*. However, some authors, such as Jordan,<sup>22</sup> have held that the *epibatai* would have been recruited from the hoplite *katalogos*, but the evidence points, rather, to voluntary service. This point, together with the information provided by two passages from Thucydides, which will be analysed below, has led to the conjecture that the *thētes* would have habitually served as *epibatai* in the fifth century.

## 2. – THĒTES EPIBATAI

Two passages from Thucydides are the main sources that have been used to defend the idea that the *epibatai*, or marines, were normally *thētes* in the fifth century. One of these passages—in the context of the expedition to Sicily during the Peloponnesian War (415)—reads as follows:

ὀπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ζύμπασιν ἑκατὸν καὶ πεντακισχιλίους καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων  
μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν  
πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν

‘five thousand and one hundred heavy infantry in all, that is to say, fifteen hundred Athenian citizens from the rolls at Athens and seven hundred *thētes* shipped as marines’.<sup>23</sup>

Jordan, and subsequently other authors such as Herzogenrath-Amelung and Okada, have pointed out that the *epibatai* are explicitly described as *thētes* on this occasion because it was an exceptional state of affairs.<sup>24</sup> Be that as it may, what is clear from this passage is that a distinction was drawn between the hoplites: on the one hand, hoplites *ek katalogou* and, on the other, hoplites *epibatai* (*thētes* in this case) who do not appear to be ‘hoplites *ek katalogou*’.

20. See, for example: *IG I<sup>3</sup> 60*; Thuc. III, 95, 2; *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032*; Aristotle. *Pol.* VII, 1327b4-15.

21. See, with sources: B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 191-194; T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status ...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 48-49.

22. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 195-196.

23. Thuc. VI, 43, 1. Trans. J.M. DENT.

24. B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 196; T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 50-51; T. OKADA, «Some notes...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 6.

The second text is another passage from Thucydides which, shortly after the disastrous Sicilian expedition and at the highpoint of the Chios rebellion in 412, states the following: εἶχον δ' ἐπιβάτας τῶν ὀπλιτῶν ἐκ καταλόγου ἀναγκαστούς 'having on board heavy infantry from the rolls pressed to serve as marines'.<sup>25</sup> From this passage it is possible to infer that 'the hoplites from the rolls (*ek katalogou*)' did not normally serve as *epibatai* and, therefore, the recruitment of the *epibatai* from the hoplite *katalogos* would not have been a matter of course, at least up until that period.<sup>26</sup> The passage also points to a clear difference or distinction between 'hoplites from the rolls' and *epibatai*, as in the previous passage from Thucydides. According to these sources, the *epibatai* could be called hoplites who 'were not drawn from the rolls'. Thus, it seems that, as a rule, the *epibatai* were not habitually recruited from the hoplite *katalogos* and that when this was indeed done, as in this case recorded by Thucydides during the Chios rebellion, following the crisis triggered by the Sicilian disaster, 'the hoplites from the lists' performed this function 'in a forced way' (ἀναγκαστούς). From this text it does not follow that the *epibatai* were *thētes*, but that they were not hoplites drawn from the *katalogos*, *pace* Jordan.

Other sources seem to confirm that service as *epibates* might have been chiefly voluntary, or at least—as stated in the passage from Thucydides—did not involve resorting to the hoplite conscription lists except in cases of need, especially as of the final years of the Peloponnesian War. According to an inscription from 430 (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 60*), a squadron of 30 ships, sent to collect tribute and to carry out raids in the Peloponnese, were manned by five volunteer *epibatai*—which shows that, even if ten *epibatai* per ship was the usual figure, this was not always the case—,<sup>27</sup> 40 hoplites, ten archers and ten peltasts. While the first two groups (*epibatai* and hoplites) were Athenians, the last two were made up of Athenians and allies in equal numbers. As in the previous passages, a distinction is yet again made between *epibatai* and hoplites (presumably regular hoplites). The *epibatai* are also called hoplites in other contexts,<sup>28</sup> so it can be assumed that the difference was that the 40 hoplites were raised 'from the deme registers', namely, enlisted following the normal procedure, while the *epibatai* were not (in this case), since it is explicitly stated in the text that they were volunteers (*ethelontes*). The distinction in this case is between 'hoplites *ek katalogou*' and volunteer hoplites who served as *epibatai* on board the ships. There are, however, many passages, for example, in Thucydides, in which no distinction is drawn between the two groups; they simply refer to generic 'hoplites', without indicating how many of these were *epibatai* and how many were *ek katalogou*.<sup>29</sup>

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25. Thuc. VIII, 24, 2. Trans. J.M. DENT.

26. The "standard" hoplites from the deme registers "were not normally assigned to the navy": M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide's...», *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 211.

27. See n. 21.

28. See n. 7.

29. See n. 7. Even so, the *epibatai* could be deployed, separately from the regular hoplites, in land fighting, as in Xen., *Hellenica*, I, 1, 34; I, 2, 7 (in 409). See T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 61.

This begs the question of whether the *epibatai* were not drawn from hoplite muster rolls because they didn't form part of that group of hoplites liable to be included in them—and therefore might have usually been *thētes*, at least until a late point in the Peloponnesian War—or because they were simply hoplites susceptible to being included in the *katalogos*, but who had decided to fight voluntarily as *epibatai*. The problem with this second hypothesis is that naval service—generally in the fleet, as rowers, archers or *epibatai*—does not appear to have been grounds for exemption from service as regular hoplites drawn from the rolls.<sup>30</sup> Fighting as a volunteer *epibates* on board of a ship does not appear to have been a reason for exemption from being raised from a muster roll for fighting on land.<sup>31</sup> The names of those no-shows at a roll call were inscribed on boards attached to the base of the *Eponymoi* and their prosecution was announced which could result in a trial for *astrateia* leading, if convicted, to *atimia*.<sup>32</sup> According to Lysias, the younger Alcibiades was liable for prosecution, “for he would with justice be convicted of refusing duty, because after being enrolled as a foot-soldier he did not march out with you (ὅτι καταλεγείς ὀπλίτης οὐκ ἐξῆθε μεθ' ὑμῶν); of desertion, because he alone of the whole force did not present himself for the formation of the ranks; and of cowardice, because, when it was his duty to share the danger with the infantry, *he chose to serve in the cavalry*”. Maybe the same could be said of an *epibates*. “he chose to serve as an *epibates* on a voluntary basis”—*ethelontes*—.<sup>33</sup>

30. As indicated by D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 49-52 at least for rowers: “Volunteering to be a rower did not stop his conscription into land forces” and “if he was at sea, when he was conscripted as a hoplite, he would be recorded as a no-show at his tribe's roll call”. Generally, those who could be conscripted into the hoplite ranks would not have served as volunteer rowers. The same could be said for the *epibatai*, viz. those who were routinely conscripted from the hoplite list would not have ordinarily served as rowers or as *epibatai* on a voluntary basis.

31. For causes of exemption from service as a regular hoplite (membership of the *Boule*, participation in a festival chorus and tax collecting, among others), see D.M. McDOWELL, *The Law in Classical Athens*, Ithaca, New York 1978, p. 160; M.H. HANSEN, *Demography and democracy: The number of Athenian citizens in the fourth century B.C.*, Herning 1985, p. 17-20.

32. Names inscribed: Dem. XXI, *Against Midias*, 103. See M.R. CHRIST, *The Bad Citizen in Classical Athens*, Cambridge 2006, p. 93 with n. 14; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 50. As regards the prosecution of those who failed to present themselves for military service in the infantry, see: Lysias, XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 5-7; C. CAREY, *Lysias: Selected Speeches*, Cambridge 1989, p. 143-144; D. HAMEL, «Coming to Terms with lipotaxion», *GRBS* 39, 1998, p. 361-405 and H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 5-6, 8-9 (*lipotaxion* and *astrateia* as “broad terms which overlapped with one another”). The penalty for *astrateia* was *atimia*: Andocides, I, *On the Mysteries*, 74. There is a tradition that traces the law of *astrateia* back to Solon: Dem. XXIV, *Against Timocrates*, 103.

33. Lysias, XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 7 (390 BC). Lysias refers (XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 5) to ἡ πεζὴ στρατιά, which is normally considered as being land forces, in contrast to its naval counterparts, but the term can also be employed to distinguish hoplites from cavalrymen (C. CAREY, *Lysias...*, *op. cit.* n. 32, p. 153; S.C. TODD, *Lysias*, Austin 2000, p.162), since later in the text the author refers several times to hoplites and the hoplite *katalogos* in opposition to the cavalry: XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 7 (ὅτι καταλεγείς ὀπλίτης), 9 (ὀπλίτης γενέσθαι), 10 (ὀπλιτεύσαντες), 11 (ἐὰν δέ τις ἐν τοῖς ὀπλίταις τεταγμένος ἐν τοῖς ἵππεδσιν ἀναφανῆ), 22 (ἐν τοῖς ὀπλίταις); also in the second speech (XV, *Against Alcibiades* 2), like, for example, in Lysias, XV, *Against Alcibiades* 2, 11. H. VAN WEES, «The Myth...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 6 observes that there were few *zeugitai* in the fleet” “because the



So, if the *epibatai* were usually hoplites who, as they were included in the *katalogos*, were eligible for regular land fighting and if they were called up to serve (for figuring in the rolls) while fighting as volunteer *epibatai*, this could have given rise to a contradiction that might ultimately have led to their prosecution for desertion. It is also feasible that they enlisted in the fleet as volunteers—in a war context—after the *strategos* had called the rolls for a specific land campaign. However, this was always risky, for, if the situation worsened, further hoplites could be conscripted from the rolls. And there was also the chance that those hoplites susceptible to being drawn from the rolls who were voluntarily fighting as *epibatai* in the fleet were not called up, although there is no documentary evidence substantiating this or that naval service—not only as a rower, but also as volunteer *epibates*—was a reason for exemption from service in the regular infantry.<sup>34</sup>

On the other hand, it would seem that a significant number of citizens of hoplite rank were regularly conscripted for active service. Aristotle notes that at the time of Ephialtes' reforms and later on (in the 460s and 450s) many—'a multitude', 'members both of the people and of the wealthy'—of those who were recruited *ek katalogou* perished, with there often being 2,000 or 3,000 casualties at a time.<sup>35</sup> The same concern for infantry casualties is echoed by Aristotle in *Politics* in relation to the Peloponnesian War, although in this case he is especially

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chance that they might be called up for the cavalry or infantry discouraged them from volunteering for other duties". From Lysias, XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 22 it is inferred, moreover, that those who were included on the hoplite list were neither deployed as cavalymen nor as *psiloi* in light troop formations (be that as it may, at the time many *epibatai* would have already been conscripted from the ordinary hoplite list and not as volunteers as before). For *psiloi* and archers and the presumably voluntary nature of their service, see D.M. PRITCHARD, «The Archers Of Classical Athens», *G&R* 65, 2018, p. 86-10. Furthermore, from this same passage (XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 22) it is inferred that the hoplites *ek katalogou* (from the lists: Lysias, XIV, *Against Alcibiades* 1, 7 -ὅτι καταλέγεις ὀπλίτης- or XV, *Against Alcibiades* 2, 11: καταλέγεις εἰς τοὺς ὀπλίτας) could be "poor" or needy ("while others lacked the necessities of life": οἱ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. Translation by W.R.M. Lamb). In 395, conscription was possibly still "*ek katalogou*", based on the lists of the demesmen drawn up by the demarchs, but these lists would no longer be made from the traditional census classes (if it is true that these were economically readjusted at the end of the fifth century with the revision of Solon's laws, according to M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGÓ, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4, comprising citizens with a status similar, in our opinion, to that of the fifth-century *zeugitai*. These changes might have led to the transformation of the recruitment system (M.R. CHRIST, «Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Athens», *CQ* 51, 2001, p. 398, 409 ff), with a period of transition between the end of the fifth century and 386-366 BC (if Christ's theory of the change in the form of military conscription at that time is correct). For the debates on the authenticity of Lysias' speeches against Alcibiades (XIV and XV), see C. CAREY, *Lysias*..., *op. cit.* n.32, p. 147-148; S.C TODD, *Lysias*, p. 162.

34. See also M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide's...», *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 211.

35. Arist., *Athenian Constitution*, XXVI, 1: "[...] and in addition, that the multitude had suffered seriously in war, for in those days the expeditionary force was raised from a muster roll (*ἐκ καταλόγου*), and was commanded by generals with no experience of war but promoted on account of their family reputations, so that it was always happening that the troops on an expedition suffered as many as two or three thousand casualties, making a drain on the numbers of the respectable members both of the people and of the wealthy" (Trans. H. RACKAM). For fifth-century recruitment, with figures and dates, see O. REES, *Trauma in Transition: Moving from Domestic to Military Service, and back again, in Classical Athens*, PhD, Manchester Metropolitan University 2018, p. 51 ff., Tables 1 and 2. For recruitment of hoplites/*zeugitai* see M. VALDÉS, «*Zeugitai* in Fifth-Century Athens...», *op. cit.* n. 4.

concerned about the death of notables (*gnorimoi*) (which does not rule out the death of other non-notables).<sup>36</sup> At the beginning of the fourth century there was presumably a law against the cowardly behaviour of the *hippeis* who attempted to shirk their duty to serve as hoplites. Citizens were prohibited from fighting in the cavalry if they had not undergone a *dokimasia*<sup>37</sup> to prevent them from ceasing to serve as hoplites. Efforts were made to prevent unauthorised knights from wriggling out of their obligation to fight as regular hoplites, probably due to the shortage of infantry troops (resulting from war casualties). This concern regarding knights was already being voiced by Aristophanes in the 420s, in the midst of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>38</sup>

So, except in the case of financial straits at a delicate moment in the family life cycle or in the probably unusual case (at least until the final years of the Peloponnesian War) that regular hoplites were forced to serve as *epibatai*, those raised from a muster roll would have not have volunteered as *epibatai* on a regular basis, at least, as will be argued here, until the Sicilian disaster, and then not on a voluntary basis.

All the testimonies of *epibatai* of good social standing—such as the uncertain case of Democleides, and those of Andocides and the *epibatai* appearing in the aforementioned inscription IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032—date from the late fifth century, after the expedition to Sicily and the drastic drop in the population of Athens. According to Hansen’s calculations,<sup>39</sup> by the end of the war this was less than half of what it had been at its outbreak. However, the fleet would remain a key factor in the conflict. In sum, the continued hostilities, the loss of troops and the high number of naval encounters led to the use of hoplites raised from muster rolls as *epibatai*, perhaps even regularly. In such cases, nevertheless, ‘regular hoplites’ did not embark as volunteer *epibatai* but were conscripted and/or recruited from the rolls, especially after Sicily, although perhaps still retaining some of the posting’s voluntary nature (for hoplites who were not liable to be included in a *katalogos*, as was the case with the *thētes*). During the Peloponnesian War, regular hoplites were not only conscripted as *epibatai* at the critical moment of the Chios rebellion in 412,<sup>40</sup> but were also forced to serve as rowers on some exceptional occasions.<sup>41</sup> As occurred in the emergency of 428 when metics and citizens of all classes were

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36. Arist. *Politics*, V, 1303a: “[...] and at Athens when they suffered disasters by land the notables became fewer because at the time of the war against Sparta the army was drawn from a muster-roll (ἐκ καταλόγου)” (Trans. H. RACKHAM).

37. Lysias XIV, *Against Alcibiades 1*, 8, 10, 15-17, 22; 15.6-7. D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy*, *op. cit.* n 5, p. 50-51. See the discourses of Lysias against Alcibiades in n. 33.

38. Ar., *Equites*, 1369-72: “Further, the hoplite enrolled for military service [1370] shall not get transferred to another service through favour, but shall stick to that given him at the outset” (Trans. E. O’NEILL).

39. Twenty-five thousand at a *minimum* in M. H. HANSEN, *Three Studies in Athenian Demography*, Copenhagen 1988, p. 22-23, 26, 28.

40. See *supra* n. 25. The fact that this was an emergency can be seen in the decision at the time to tap the ‘Iron Reserve’ of 1,000 talents on the Acropolis: Thuc. VIII, 15, 1; L. KALLET, *Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and its Aftermath*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2001, p. 246-50; S. HORNBLOWER, *A Commentary on Thucydides...*, *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 794-795.

41. In 428 (Thuc. III, 18, 3), the 1,000 hoplite citizens dispatched to Lesbos with Paches served as rowers.

forcibly embarked on the ships ‘except *pentakosiomedimnoi* and *hippeis*’.<sup>42</sup> This situation was exceptional because, first and foremost, crews were ‘pressganged’, as it were, when it seems that service in the fleet used to be voluntary, albeit mandatory in times of extreme necessity, as in Salamis.<sup>43</sup> Secondly, since the citizens (except for the trierarchs) habitually serving in the navy were *thētes*, namely, rowers (in addition to foreigners and slaves), that *zeugitai* also embarked this time is quite remarkable, thus indicating that it was not at all common for them to do so as regular crew members. For the naval Battle of Arginusae, in addition to *zeugitai*, members of the *hippeis* were conscripted,<sup>44</sup> all of which poses the question of the role played by the census classes in recruitment. But let us first examine Themistocles’ decree.

Given the seriousness of the situation in Salamis, all the male citizens of Athens, barring the elderly, were conscripted into the navy.<sup>45</sup> The fourth/third-century decree states that the *epibatai* were recruited from the muster roll (καταλέξει δὲ καὶ ἐπ[ι]βάτας [δ]έκα [ἐφ’ ἐκάστη] ν ναῦν: lin. 23-24). On this occasion, when all the Athenians from all the census classes, except the elderly, embarked on 200 ships, it would have been normal to select the ‘regular’ hoplites to serve as *epibatai* or ship hoplites. In other words, even though *thētes* might have served as such before or would do so later on, and given that all the male citizens of Athens had been conscripted, it stands to reason that the regular hoplites (*ek katalogou*) would have been called on to serve as *epibatai*—ten per ship—on that occasion. In Marathon, at the beginning of the fifth century, there were apparently c. 9,000 hoplites in Athens.<sup>46</sup> All the *epibatai* on the ships were

42. Thuc. III, 16, 1. Emergency situation: V. ROSIVACH, «Manning the Athenian Fleet, 433-426 BC», *AJAH* 10, 1985, p. 46; V. GABRIELSEN, *Financing...*, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 107. In 428, there is confirmation of an active fleet of 250 ships, the highest figure given by Thucydides for this: Thuc. III, 17, 2.

43. Service in the fleet was generally voluntary (Ar., *Acharnians*, 545-7; B. JORDAN, *The Athenian Navy*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 101-103; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 98; H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 26-27, but could be, in exceptional circumstances, by conscription. See V. GABRIELSEN, *Financing...*, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 107; (2002) 204-205; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 51; G. BAKEWELL, «Trierarchs’ Records...», *op. cit.* n. 8, p. 144-145; H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 17.

44. Xen., *Hellenica*, I, 6, 24. V. GABRIELSEN, *Financing...*, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 107. Even though in this case “*hippeis*” might have referred to members of the cavalry and not of the census class per se.

45. Herodotus (Hdt. VII, 144, 3) says that the Athenians “meet the foreign invader of Hellas with the whole power of their fleet, ships and men, and with all other Greeks who were so minded” (Trans. A.D. Godley). Thucydides (Thuc. I, 18, 2) notes that “the Athenians having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw themselves into their ships, and became a naval people” (Trans. J.M. DENT). See also Plutarch., *Themistocles*, IV, 3. For the decree of Themistocles, see n. 17.

46. 9,000 in Nep. *Miltiades*, V, 1; Paus. X, 20, 2. 10,000 in Justin, *Epitome*, II, 9, 9 and 8,000 in Platea: Hdt. IX, 28, 6; Plut., *Aristides*, XI, 1. A.H.M. JONES, *Athenian Democracy*, Oxford 1957, p. 8, 161 (30 per cent of 30,000); H. VAN WEES, *Greek Warfare...*, *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 241-243 (40 per cent of the population). According to M. VALDÉS and J. GALLEGO, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4 and J. GALLEGO, «El campesinado y la distribución del a tierra en la Atenas del s.IV a.C. », *Gerión* 34, p. 64-65, c. 9,000 hoplites would have represented the first three census classes, unlike H. van Wees who believes that there were also *thētes* among their number: see n. 3. It should be noted, however, that this figure refers to the field army as a whole and not to the total number of hoplites. It is possible that men of all ages up to 59, or at least 49, would have been mustered (91.3 or 79.4% of adult male citizen population: see table in M.H. HANSEN, *Demography and democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 31, p. 12), and/or that

young men aged between 20 and 30, namely, those who were in better physical shape. Offering a rough estimate, 33.3 per cent (those between 20 and 30 years old)<sup>47</sup> of all adult male citizens of hoplite status (approximately 9,000 out of a total adult male population of 30,000) would have accounted for c. 2,997 men of hoplite rank in that age bracket, who divided by 200 ships gives an average of 14.9 men<sup>48</sup> who could serve as *epibatai* per ship. The decree indicates that there were ten per ship, but Plutarch curiously notes that 14 young people embarked as *epibatai*, one of whose number might have been the young Cimon.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, in this specific case it may be assumed that the *epibatai* were many of the young men, in the 20 to 30 age bracket, of the 9,000 hoplites that Athens had at that time. This number (c. 9,000) coincides with those liable to be raised from a muster roll (*pace van Wees*)<sup>50</sup> and, therefore, would not have presumably been *thētes*. It is only natural that, as in the decree of the end of the fifth century, they are named second after the trierarchs, not only because they played a key role in the fleet, but also for effectively occupying in this case a higher position than the majority of citizens who would have been *thētes*. At the time, the *thētes* would have accounted for approximately 70 per cent of the population.<sup>51</sup>

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those 9,000 or 10,000 men actually included light infantry, as well, as postulated by H. van Wees, or even slaves, as Pausanias suggests (Paus. X, 20, 2: “those who were too old for active service and slaves”). In any case, the number of members of the hoplite class might well have amounted to c. 9,000, as at the end of the fourth century with Antipater (see n. 69), at a time when there was a similar population of adult male citizens (c. 30,000: see n. 51): J. GALLEGRO, «El campesinado », p. 64-65.

47. M.H. HANSEN, *Demography and democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 31, table on page 12. Hansen’s calculations are based on the Coale-Demeny model life table system: A.J. COALE, P. DEMENY, *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Population*, Princeton 1966 (*non vidi*). Be that as it may, this figure should be treated with utmost caution, as B. AKRIGG («Demography and classical Athens» in C. HOLLERAN, H. PUDSEY eds., *Demography and the Graeco-Roman World: New Insights and Approaches* Cambridge 2011, p. 37-59) observes, highlighting the shortcomings of demographic calculation methods (with special attention to Hansen’s work).

48. See previous note. For people with more than 3,6 ha or 2,000 drachmas (in fourth century criteria), see n. 4.

49. See n. 17. One of these young men might have been Cimon: Plutarch, *Cimon*, V, 2.

50. For this author, only those with more than 12-14 hectares would have been included in such a muster roll: see n. 4. See next point.

51. At that time, the population would have been around 30,000 citizens, so that those below hoplite rank would have accounted for about 21,000. Herodotus speaks of 30,000 on the eve of the Persian Wars: Hdt. 5. 97. 2; also in Hdt. VII, 65, 1; Ar., *Ecclesiazusae*, 1132; Pl., *Symp.* 175e. This figure is defended by A.H.M. JONES, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 8, 161. For population calculations at the beginning of the fifth century: A.W. GOMME, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.*, Oxford 1933, p. 25-26; C. PATTERSON, *Pericles’ citizenship law of 451-50 B.C.*, New York 1981, p. 48-58; P. GARNSEY, *Famine and food supply in the Graeco-Roman world. Responses to risk and crisis*, Cambridge 1988, p. 89-91 (from around 30,000 to 37,000 male citizens in 480); K.A. RAAFLAUB, «Equalities and inequalities in Athenian democracy» in J. OBER, C. HEDRICK eds., *Demokratia. A conversation on democracies, ancient and modern*, Princeton 1996, p. 165, n. 65; R. OSBORNE, *Athens and Athenian Democracy*, Cambridge 2010, p. 246. J. GALLEGRO, «El campesinado...», *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 64 with n. 82.

### 3. – A NOTE ON THE CENSUS CLASSES AND THEIR ROLE IN FIFTH-CENTURY RECRUITMENT

In the Cleisthenic tribal system, recruitment *ek katalogou* was carried out using the lists drawn up by the demarchs on the basis of the deme registers (*lexiarchika grammateia*), which were then given to the *strategoí* and the *taxiarchoi*.<sup>52</sup> All those men who could be mandatorily recruited as hoplites were included on these lists, and there were similar ones for recruiting cavalrymen.<sup>53</sup> It is possible that the demarchs might have also presented lists of those who could be recruited as rowers, if required, although it seems that this did not often occur in the fifth century.<sup>54</sup> Some authors have assumed that the criterion for being recruited as a hoplite on a regular basis was to belong, at least, to the census class of the *zeugitai*,<sup>55</sup> since some sources suggest that the *thētes* ‘do not fight’. This should be understood as ‘they do not fight mandatorily as regular hoplites raised from the rolls’, as they usually served in the navy or

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52. See M.R. CHRIST, «Conscription...», *op. cit.* n. 33; G. BAKEWELL, «Written Lists of Military personnel in Classical Athens» in C. COOPER ed., *Politics of Orality*, Leiden 2007, p. 90-93. The first attested mention of the role of the *lexiarchika grammateia* in the recruitment of cavalrymen and hoplites (but, in this case, only referring to land forces: see M.H. JAMESON, *Cults and Rites in Ancient Greece: Essays on Religion and Society*, Cambridge 2014, p. 49-51) is IG I<sup>3</sup> 138 (c. 440). Themistocles’ decree (see n. 17), also mentions *katalogos*. For the *lexiarchika grammateia*, see M.H. HANSEN, *Demography and democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 31, p. 14-15; D. WHITEHEAD, *The Demes of Attica, 508/7 -ca. 250 B.C.: A Political and Social Study*, Princeton, New Jersey 1986, p. 35-36, with n. 130, and 135. For registration in Classical Greece: M. FARAGUNA, «Citizens, Non-Citizens, and Slaves: Identification Methods in Classical Greece» in M. DEPAW, S. COUSSEMENT eds., *Identifiers and Identification Methods in the Ancient World. Legal Documents in Ancient Societies III*, Leuven Paris, Walpole MA 2014, p. 165-184.

53. Although the cavalry class (*hippeis*) did not coincide exactly with the knights (*hippeis*), neither as regards their age nor with respect to their physical attributes (D. PRITCHARD, «The Armed Forces» in J. NEILS, D. ROGERS eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Athens*, Cambridge 2021, p. 405-418), this does not mean to say that cavalrymen were not fundamentally drawn, as postulated by M.H. HANSEN (in n. 55), from the first two census classes (*hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi*). See also H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 29-30. The cavalry included men who did not own any land (Lysias, XXXIV, *Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens*, 4); so, membership to any of the censitarian classes (if, as it seems, members of the cavalry were drawn fundamentally from the top two classes and, above all, from the *hippeis*) must have depended no only on land ownership, but also on monetary worth in the fifth century. For this topic see M. VALDÉS, «Zeugitai in Fifth-Century Athens...», *op. cit.* n. 4.

54. See n. 43. Regarding the recruitment of naval forces from the lists of the demesmen drawn up by the demarchs: Dem. L, *Against Polycles*, 6. For a probable recruitment of naval forces *ek katalogou* in exceptional circumstances, see also Thuc. VII, 16, 1. V. GABRIELSEN, «The Impact of Armed Forces on Government and Politics in Archaic and Classical Greek *Poleis*: A Response to H. van Wees» in A. CHANIOTIS, P. DUCREY eds., *Army and Power in the Ancient World*, Stuttgart 2002, p. 89, 93-94; M.R. CHRIST, «Conscription...», *op. cit.* n. 33, p. 401.

55. See, among others: M.H. HANSEN, *The Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 45-46, 116; STE. CROIX, *Athenian Democratic...*, *op. cit.* n. 1. *contra*: V. GABRIELSEN, «Socio-economic Classes and Ancient Greek Warfare» in K. ASCANI, V. GABRIELSEN, K. KVIST, A.H. RASMUSSEN, eds., *Ancient History Matters. Studies Presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on his Seventieth Birthday*, Roma 2002, p. 211. For the term “zeugites” as a military one: D. WHITEHEAD, «The Archaic Athenian *Zeugitai*», *CQ* n. s. 31, 1981, p. 282-286. See, however, M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGÓ, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 261 with n. 26. M. VALDÉS, «Zeugitai in Fifth-Century Athens...», *op. cit.* n. 4.



as light infantrymen or archers, generally (albeit not always) on a voluntary basis.<sup>56</sup> This assumption has a fuller meaning when equating the *zeugitai* with those of ‘hoplite status,’ namely, those owning more than 40 *plethra*<sup>57</sup> who could afford military equipment and usually served as hoplites in the fifth century. Based on the measures provided by Aristotle in the fourth century, however, van Wees postulated that the *zeugitai* census was much higher, a theory that has been contested by other authors.<sup>58</sup> Even so, van Wees contended that only the first three census classes were included in the *katalogos*.<sup>59</sup> Other authors, such as Pritchard,<sup>60</sup> have suggested that the decision to fight as a hoplite, a cavalrymen or in the navy was a personal one which was made when the names of citizens aged 18 were inscribed in their deme register. Nonetheless, he also recognises that this depended to a great extent on the financial means of each citizen. This was undoubtedly so for the *hippeis* and the hoplites who had to pay for their military equipment and were sometimes (although not always) accompanied by servants, whereas rowers only had to purchase a cushion<sup>61</sup> This may lead us to think that drawing up the lists using the registration of citizens according to their census classes, which would have been fully operational by the fifth century, was a matter of course.<sup>62</sup> If this was indeed the case and the hoplites were recruited from the *zeugite* census class, it is understandable that the hoplites included in the *katalogos* did not receive this name—*zeugitai*—because, in addition to the members of this class, there would have also been *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi* among

56. In a fragment of Aristophanes’ *The Banqueters (Daitaleis)* (Fr. 248 Kassel-Austin) from 427, cited in Harpocration’s lexicon (s.v. *thētes kai thetikon*), it is said that the *thētes* do not fight (ἐστρατεύοντο), which is understood in the sense of fighting as hoplites *ek katalogou*: H. VAN WEES, «The Myth...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 59; M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGO, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 258. H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 27: “Since no one was exempt from general levies, in context this presumably meant either that *thētes* did not serve as hoplites, or that they were not liable to selective conscription.” See also the fragment of Antiphon *infra* in n. 98. For voluntary service in the fleet with few exceptions: see n. 40.

57. See n. 55. The *minimum* for attaining hoplite status was 40-60 *plethra* (3.6-5.4 ha): see n. 4.

58. See n. 4. Many authors reject applying Aristotle’s measures (*Athenian Politeia*, VII, 4; also in Pollux VIII, 132) to the Solonian census classes (except for the *pentakosiomedimnoi*): P.J. RHODES, «Introduction» in L. MITCHELL, P.J. RHODES eds., *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece*, London-New York 1997, p. 4; P.J. RHODES, «The Reforms and Laws of Solon: An Optimistic View» in J. BLOK, A. LARDINOIS eds., *Solon of Athens. New Historical and Philological Approaches*, Leiden-New York 2006, p. 253; M.H. HANSEN, *The Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 30; V. ROSIVACH, «The Requirements for the Solonic Classes in Aristotle, AP 7.4», *Hermes* 130, 2002, p. 41; STE. CROIX, *Athenian Democratic...*, *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 48-49; M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGO, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4; G.T. MAVROGORDATOS, «Two Puzzles Involving Socrates», *CW* 105, 2011, p. 12-15.

59. See H. VAN WEES in n. 1.

60. D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 43-45.

61. Cushion for rowers: Isoc. VIII, *Ad reges Mytilenaeos*, 48; Thuc. II, 93, 2; Eupolis, fr. 54 Kassel-Austin; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 45.

62. The *zeugitai* were admitted to the offices after Ephialtes by 457: [Arist.] *Athenian Politeia*, XXVI, 2. *Thētes* and *zeugitai* in Brea Colony (445 BC): *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 46, lin. 43-46. The only mention of the census classes in a military context is the controversial testimony of Thucydides in the emergency of 428: Thuc. III, 16, 1 (all embarked except the *pentakosiomedimnoi* and the *hippeis*). The use of censitarian classes for military uses probably declined at the end of fifth century: M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGO, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4.

their number, who at that moment were not serving in the cavalry (totalling 1,000 members)<sup>63</sup> or as trierarchs or performing any other liturgy.<sup>64</sup> Although the *zeugitai* were probably defined as ‘owners of a team of oxen’ in Solon’s time, which coincides with a property of between 4 and 5 hectares,<sup>65</sup> in the fifth century, probably since Cleisthenes,<sup>66</sup> they would have been identified as those possessing a certain amount of wealth or *timema* (capital)<sup>67</sup> which would have perhaps coincided with the *minimum* required to form part of the ‘hoplite rank’, viz. normally between 40 and 60 *plethra* (3.6 to 5.4 ha).<sup>68</sup> The indication that this rank existed in classical times is the fourth-century reference to Antipater disfranchising those whose assets amounted to less than 2,000 drachmas.<sup>69</sup> *This figure is perhaps significant.* At the time (in the fourth century), this property qualification (*timema*) was equivalent—with a price of around 50 drachmas the

63. As to the cavalry: G.R. BUGH, *The Horsemen of Athens*, Princeton 1988; I.G. SPENCE, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece: A Social and Military History with Particular Reference to Athens*, Oxford 1993; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 53-55. *Id.*, «The Armed Forces...», *op. cit.* n. 53, p. 2-4.

64. Regarding exemption from service as a hoplite *ek katalogou*, see n. 30.

65. Pollux, VIII, 132: καὶ ζευγῆσιόν τι τέλος οἱ ζευγοτροφοῦντες; M. VALDÉS, J. GALLEGO, «Athenian *Zeugitai*...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 266, 270. On the use of a yoke of oxen on plots of land averaging 4-5 ha: S. HODKINSON, «Animal Husbandry in the Greek *Polis*» in C.R. WHITTAKER ed., *Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge 1988, p. 39-40; A. BURFORD, *Land and Labor...*, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 67; H.A. FORBES, «The Agrarian Economy of the Ermionidha around 1700. An Ethnohistorical Reconstruction» in S. BUCK SUTTON ed., *Contingent Countryside, Settlement, Economy and Land Use in the Southern Argolid since 1700*, Stanford 2000, p. 63-64. Possessing oxen was the primary distinction among the farmers: Hes. *Op.* 405; Arist. *Politics*, 1252b12.

66. There must have been a consuetudinary *nomos* for recruitment in Athens, as it is said in *IG I<sup>3</sup> 60*: ἡ[εκατ]ὸν κα[τὰ τὸν νόμον καταλεχσάσθ]ον κατὰ φιλὰς ἐχς Ἀθ[εν]αίων. This *nomos* could date back to the Cleisthenic reforms. For military reforms in Cleisthenes’ time, see H. VAN EFFENTERRE, «Clisthène et les mesures de mobilisation», *REG* 89, 1976, p. 1-17; P. SIEWERT, *Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes*, München 1982; G.R. STANTON, «The Tribal Reform of Kleisthenes the Alkmeonid», *Chiron* 14, 1986, p. 1-41. See M. VALDÉS, «*Zeugitai* in Fifth-Century Athens...», *op. cit.* n. 4.

67. *Eisphora* was based on *timema* not on income in the fourth century, before and after 378: R. THOMSEN, *Eisphora: A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens*, Copenhagen 1964, p. 181-183 (all kinds of property were taken into account, not only the land). The Solonian classes were based, according to Aristotle, on income or produce ([Arist.] *Athenaion Politeia* VII, 1), but Plato (*Leges*, 955d-e) discusses the possibilities of a tax system based on both *timema* (capital) and income. It is possible that the census classes were the focus of attention in Cleisthenic times if they were used as a basis for recruitment in the army: see previous note. They would have been adjusted at that time to a new monetary reality with the introduction of the Athenian owls.

68. See n. 4.

69. According to Diodorus Siculus (XVIII, 18, 4-5), 22,000 were disfranchised by Antipater; see E. Poddighe, *Nel segno di Antipatro. L’eclissi della democrazia ateniese dal 323/2 al 319/8 a.C.*, Roma 2002, p. 59-69 (with bibliography and sources). Poddighe explains the different figures provided by Diodorus and Plutarch (*Phocion*, XXVIII, 7: 12,000 excluded), by contending that those 12,000 were readmitted to the *politeia* when the requirement dropped from 2,000 to 1,000 drachmas with Cassander in 317. In the census carried out by Demetrius of Phalerum between 317 and 307 (Ctesicles *FGrH* 245 F 1 = Athenaeus, VI, 272b-c) it is indicated that there were 21,000 citizens at the time, which suggests that, despite the fact that some had regained their citizen status, around 9,000/10,000 people (of a total of c. 30,000-31,000 citizens at that time: M.H. HANSEN, *Demography and democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 31; *Id.*, *Three Studies...*, *op. cit.* n. 39; *Id.*, *The Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 92-93), would still have been left out, to whom should be added their wives and children. See also J. GALLEGO, «El campesinado...», *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 47-48.

*plethron*—to 40 *plethra* or 3.6 hectares.<sup>70</sup> In the fifth century, Athenians with assets equivalent to this amount of land or to its purchase price in drachmas, would have been enrolled at the age of 18, by their own declaration, in the deme with the rank of *zeugitai* and could perhaps have been automatically included on the hoplite list. This does not mean to say that all the *zeugitai* were farmers, as Okada correctly points out, for there would not have been sufficient land for all in Attica.<sup>71</sup> The *zeugitai* might have included artisans and/or professionals with this *timema* (in workshops, houses, slaves, etc.) among their number, if the financial requirements for enrolment in a census class, as apparently occurred later on in the case of the *eisphora*,<sup>72</sup> was not only measured in land.<sup>73</sup> That there were *zeugitai* and/or hoplites who were not landowners is perhaps illustrated by Socrates and probably of his father, both sculptors by profession, whose names would have been entered on the deme registers (*lexiarchika grammateia*) on reaching the age of 18 (Socrates in about 452 BC, surely before embarking on his career as a philosopher) probably as *zeugitai* judging by their *timema*,<sup>74</sup> and consequently would have been called up as hoplites on various occasions, in Socrates' case perhaps in Samos (440)

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70. V.N. ANDREYEV, «Some Aspects...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 14-18. Followed by A. BURFORD, *Land and Labor...*, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 67-72; M.H. JAMESON, «Class in the Ancient...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 59; V.D. HANSON, *The Other Greeks...*, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 181-201; P. HALSTEAD, *Two Oxen Ahead...*, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 61; E. PODDIGHE, *Nel segno...*, *op. cit.* n. 69, p. 137; H. VAN WEES, «Mass and Elite...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 357-358 y n. 34. See J. GALLEGÓ, «El campesinado...», *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 52.

71. T. OKADA, «Zeugitai and hoplites», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 27. The amount of arable land in Attica is only 96,000 hectares: P. GARNSEY, *Famine...*, *op. cit.* n. 51, p. 91-93. For around 24,000 hoplites in 431, see n. 81.

72. See n. 67.

73. For examples of workshops and their value: E.M. HARRIS, «Workshop, Marketplace and Household, the Nature of Technical Specialization in Classical Athens and its Influence on Economy and Society» in P. CARTLEDGE, D. COHEN, L. FOXHALL eds., *Money, labour and land. Approaches to the economies of ancient Greece*, London-New York 2002, p. 81; This author offers several examples such as a perfume store valued at 40 mines—4,000 drachmas—(Hyperides, III, *Against Athenogenes*, 18) and the furniture company of Demosthenes' father valued at 65-70 mines. There are, however, examples of smaller workshop with lower values, known from mortgage-*horoi* (from 500 drachmas to two talents): E.M. HARRIS, «Workshop...», p. 81 (the largest would have been worth, at the very most, three talents). For the possible profitability of a domestic workshops with slaves: Xen., *Memorabilia*, 2.7.6. Regarding citizen artisans, see also: P. ACTON, *Poiesis: Manufacturing in Classical Athens*, Oxford 2014, p. 270-274.

74. Socrates was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus: Aristoxenus, fr. 51 Wehrli. See C.A. HUFFMAN, *Aristoxenus of Tarentum: Discussion*, New Brunswick 2012, p. 261. Valerius Maximus, 3.4 ext.1; Diogenes Laertius, II, 19 citing Duris of Samos (*FGrH* 76 F 78); Cyrillus, *Adversus Iulianum*, 208a. As a young man, Socrates in all likelihood worked as a sculptor: Lucan, *Somnium*, 12. Also the scholium to Aristophanes' *Clouds* (773) indicates that he was the son of the sculptor Sophroniscus, "[...] so he learned to carve marble and made marble sculptures, among which are the three Graces [...]" (which implies that he had also carved others). R.E. WYCHERLEY, *The Stones of Athens*, Princeton 1978, p. 131. In the artisan group, the position of a sculptor was one of the most lofty: C. FEYEL, *Les artisans dans les sanctuaires grecs aux époques classique et hellénistique à travers la documentation financière en Grèce*, Paris 2006, p. 415. For sculptors, see A. BURFORD, *Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society*, London 1972, p. 142.

and certainly in Potidea, Delium and Amphipolis.<sup>75</sup> And all this irrespective of the fact that Socrates eventually impoverished himself by abandoning his trade—there is no reason why his wealth should not have fluctuated during his 70 years of life—and that he ended up, therefore, being poor as a *thēs*. He might have even been degraded to this status and enrolled in this category, although due to the inertia of the Athenian system this is uncertain.<sup>76</sup>

Registration in the deme in a census class was essential for holding political office. It is reasonable to believe that this registry was used for recruiting hoplites and knights from the lists, because if the class of *zeugitai* was the minimum requirement for being recruited as a hoplite, this would have made the demarchs' task of drawing them up much simpler. This was at least the case for the *zeugitai* (much more numerous than the first two classes) who would always be 'hoplites', although the *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi* (much less numerous) could be hoplites as well as cavalrymen. This does not rule out that there were *thētes* who, due to their circumstances, possessed the hoplite equipment (or part of it)<sup>77</sup> and who enlisted as volunteers to fight as hoplites both in land campaigns and, above all, at sea as *epibatai*, as will be seen below.

But who among the *thētes* could have routinely served as volunteer *epibatai* in the navy and by what means?

#### 4. – THĒTES DEMOGRAPHY

The *thētes* seem to have made up 70 per cent of the population at the beginning of the fifth (and at the end of the fourth) century, out of a total of c. 30,000 male citizens over the age of 18. If there were around 9,000 hoplites (including the *pentakosiomedimnoi* and *hippeis*) at the beginning of the fifth century, in theory there would have been 21,000 *thētes*, provided that the estimate of a total of 30,000 adult male citizens is correct.<sup>78</sup> It is curious that this figure—21,000—roughly coincides with those disfranchised by Antipater for having assets amounting to less than 2,000 drachmas at a time when the Athenian population was similar to that at the beginning of the fifth century,<sup>79</sup> viz. 30,000 adult male citizens aged over 18. During the Pentecontaetia the population of Athens seems to have doubled so that apparently

75. Maybe in Samos: Diogenes Laertius, II, 23. For the other occasions: Plato, *Apologia*, 28e; Plato, *Symposium*, 219e-221b; Plato, *Laches*, 181b. See G.T. MAVROGORDATOS, «Two Puzzles...», *op. cit.* n. 58. It is highly improbable that he fought on all these occasions as a volunteer, given his custom of shunning public affairs (an exception being his membership to the *Boule* in 406, when he was probably conscripted in an emergency situation: Plato, *Apologia*, 32b; *Gorgias*, 473e; Xen., *Hellenica*, I, 7, 15); Plato, *Apologia*, 31d.

76. At the end of his life, he has a *timema* of 500 drachmas: Xen., *Oeconomicus*, II, 3. As regards the poverty of Socrates in view of his status, see: G.T. MAVROGORDATOS, «Two Puzzles...», *op. cit.* n. 58. See M. VALDÉS, «Sócrates, pobre como un *thes*» in F. REDUZZI *et al.* eds., *Le realtà della schiavitù: identità e biografie da Eumeo a Frederick Douglass (Atti del XL Convegno Internazionale del GIREA, Napoli 2017)*, Napoli 2020, p. 107-127.

77. For the cost of the *ta hopla*, see n. 88.

78. See n. 46 and 51.

79. For the population in the fourth century, see n. 69.

in the 430s there could have been, according to Hansen's calculations, 60,000 male citizens.<sup>80</sup> In those years the proportion of hoplites might have reached 40 per cent, with approximately 24,000 men of hoplite status (several of them belonging to the same households).<sup>81</sup> The proportion of *thētes* would perhaps have been slightly lower than at the beginning of the fifth and at the end of the fourth century, but, nonetheless, very numerous due to demographic growth: 36,000, that is, around 60 per cent of 60,000 (42,000, if they accounted for 70 per cent of the population).<sup>82</sup> This hypothetical variation was possibly due to both the colonies and cleruchies<sup>83</sup> and to the economic prosperity that resulted in many being wealthy enough to enrol as *zeugitai* in their deme register, even though real estate was not their main source of income, as might have been the case with Socrates in his youth and/or his father.<sup>84</sup>

Some *thētes* derived their income from land (less than 3.6 ha), but many others also from other types of more or less profitable activities: sculptors and artisans with their own workshop (with or without slaves),<sup>85</sup> employees or seasonal workers, unskilled workers, etc. As before, there is important information from the fourth century which points to a distinction between those considered here as *thētes* (under 'hoplite rank'). After Antipater's disenfranchisement it seems that those who had cash assets of between 1,000 and 2,000 drachmas—or who owned between 1.8 and 3.6 hectares at that time—accounting, as stated in the sources, for 12,000

80. A.W. GOMME, *The Population...*, *op. cit.* n. 51, p. 25-26 estimated a total of 47,000 citizens in 431; I. MORRIS, *Burial and Ancient Society. The Rise of the Greek City-state*, Cambridge 1987, p. 100 (from 35,000 to 40,000 at the time). However, A.H.M. JONES, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 167-173 proposes about 60,000 citizens, like M.H. HANSEN, *Demography and Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 31; *Id.*, *Three Studies...*, *op. cit.* n. 39, p. 14-28 (in this study, M.H. Hansen calculated the population in 431 on the basis of war casualties, assuming that there must have been at least 60,000 citizens); M.H. HANSEN, *The Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 53 and 86-88; P. GARNSEY, *Famine...*, *op. cit.* n. 51, p. 89-91 postulates 250,000 citizen families (that is, around 62,500 citizens). See also P.J. RHODES, *Thucydides: History II*, Warminster 1988, p. 271-277.

81. Thirteen thousand hoplites available in 431: Thuc. II, 13, 6-7; Diodorus Siculus, II, 40, 3. See M.R. CHRIST, «Conscription...», *op. cit.* n. 33, p. 401; R. THOMSEN, *Eisphora...*, *op. cit.* n. 67, p. 162-163. P.J. RHODES, *Thucydides...*, *op. cit.* n. 80, p. 274, who estimated a total of between 21,000 and 29,000 hoplites in 431; P. GARNSEY, *Famine...*, *op. cit.* n. 51, p. 92, estimated between 18,000 and 25,000; H. VAN WEES, «The Myth...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 51 speaks of 18,000, but then (H. VAN WEES, «Mass and Elite...» – in n. 1 –, p. 374 n. 90) suggests that there were 24,000. Some of them were *klerouchoi* and/or members of a colony, according to Figueira (1991) Table 3. T. FIGUEIRA, «Colonisation in the Classical Period» in G.R. TSETSKHLADZE ed., *Greek Colonisation. An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas*, Leiden-Boston 2008, p. 459.

82. For a population of 42,000 under hoplite rank: H. VAN WEES, «The Myth...», *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 53, Table 3.

83. See Figueira n. 81; also: J. GALLEGÓ, «La cleruquía ateniense en Lesbos: Distribución de la tierra y explotación de los nativos», *Nova Tellus* 40, 2022, p. 1-36.

84. See n. 74. For the promotion from *thes* to *hippeus*: [Arist.] *Athenaion Politeia*, VII, 4. Iasos de Kollytos, a funerary stele manufacturer, was able to join the liturgical class at the beginning of the fourth century because he acted as *choregos* in 387/386: *IG II<sup>2</sup> 2318*, l. 206; J.K. DAVIES, *Athenian Propertied Families*, Oxford 1971, p. 242 (he could have been a sculptor in the Erechtheum in 408-406); C. FEYEL, *Les artisans...*, *op. cit.* n. 74, p. 415 (with bibliography). Another possible testimony of the promotion from *thēs* to *zeugites* in an inscription from the fifth century (c. 480 or a little later): A.E. RAUBITSCHKE, *Dedications from the Athenian Akropolis. A Catalogue of the Inscriptions of the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C.*, Massachusetts 1949, p. 400-401, no. 372.

85. As to workshops, see E.M. HARRIS, «Workshop...», *op. cit.* n. 73; P. ACTON, *Poiesis...*, *op. cit.* n. 73.



Athenians, regained their citizen status thanks to Demetrius of Phalerum.<sup>86</sup> Most of these, according to Gallego's study, would have been landowning peasants in the fourth century. If land ownership remained relatively stable between the fifth and fourth centuries, as appears to have been the case,<sup>87</sup> it is possible that at least a similar number of Athenians had an equivalent *timema* in the fifth century. In the golden years of the Pentecontaetia, however, that number might have been higher due to economic prosperity, so some would have derived their *timema* from income sources other than land.

Possibly some of these *thētes* with a *timema* of between 1.8 and 3.6 ha (1,000 and 2,000 drachmas in fourth century parameters) were able to acquire the hoplite panoply or part of it, at least those in the upper bracket, namely, the owners of between 2.7 and 3.6 hectares or their cash equivalent. The full hoplite panoply could cost between 75 and 100 drachmas, but the bare *minimum*, a shield and a sword, could be purchased relatively cheaply.<sup>88</sup> In the fourth century, the state provided hoplites with equipment<sup>89</sup> although this does not seem to have been the case in the previous century. Nevertheless, it can be conjectured that, in some expeditions, the *epibatai thētes* might have been provided with weapons, especially in the first part of the Pentecontaetia,<sup>90</sup> above all when the *epibatai* were not recruited from among the hoplites *ek katalogou* necessary for land operations.<sup>91</sup> On the other hand, from the age of 18 young rowers, might have ultimately saved enough from their salaries to purchase the equipment

86. See n. 69. J. GALLEGRO, «El campesinado...», *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 47.

87. J. GALLEGRO, «El campesinado...», *op. cit.* n. 46, p. 69.

88. Between 75 and 100 drachmas: W.R. CONNOR, «Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression», *PP* 119, 1988, p. 10 with n. 30; H. VAN WEES, *Greek Warfare...*, *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 48, 52-53, 55. This author has pointed out that the hoplites did not need to fight with the full panoply (including the pricey metal *thorax*) and that the minimum (c. 25-30 drachmas) requirement (a shield and a spear) was relatively cheap to come by; see H. VAN WEES, «Tyrants, oligarchs and citizen militias» in A. CHANIOTIS, P. DUCREY eds., *Army and Power in the Ancient World*, Stuttgart 2002, p. 63-64; also V.D. HANSON, *The Other Greeks...*, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 57-59. Full armour was handed down in part from fathers to sons: K. RAAFLAUB, «Soldiers, Citizens, and the Evolution of the Early Greek Polis» in L.G. MITCHELL, P.J. RHODES eds., *The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece*, London-New York 1997, p. 54. Settlers in Salamis (c. 500) were expected to possess arms and armour worth at least 30 drachmas: *IG I<sup>3</sup> 1*, lin. 9-10.

89. [Arist.] *Athenaion Politeia*, XLII, 4: the cadets receive a *shield and spear* from the state. In Aeneas Tacticus (16.3), the generals “provide equipment for some”.

90. For the possibility that the Spartans equipped the Himeraeans *nautai* with arms to fight: Thuc. VII, 1, 3 (τοῖς ἐκ τῶν νεῶν τῶν σφετέρων ναύταις ὅσοι μὴ εἶχον ὄπλα παρασχεῖν) and 5. This idea was suggested to the Spartans by Alcibiades (Thuc. VI, 91, 4), which is very telling. This policy might have been implemented, for example, by Cimon, in keeping with his evergetism (Plutarch, *Cimon*, X, 2-4); he made the Athenians board the ships, according to Plutarch (Plutarch, *Cimon*, XI, 2): “On the other hand, he made great numbers of the Athenians man their ships, one crew relieving another, and imposed on them the toil of his expeditions, and so in a little while, by means of the very wages which they got from the allies, made them lords of their own paymasters.” With respect to the bonuses that the trierarchs paid to their crews: V. GABRIELSEN, *Financing...*, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 111-125; G. BAKEWELL, «Trierarchs' Records...», *op. cit.* n. 8, p. 146-147. For Cleinias son of Alcibiades, who for the Persian War (Artemisium) brought with him “two hundred men and a ship of his own, all at his own expense” (Trans. A.D. GODLEY) see Hdt. VIII, 17. Similarly, Telemachus was able to man a ship with a crew consisting of slaves (*dmoes*) and *thētes*: Hom. *Odyssey*, IV, 644.

91. Although they were shipped to their destination and fought on land. See n. 13 for the transport of hoplites.

required to join the ranks of the *epibatai*. However that may be, it is more plausible that the wealthiest *thētes*, those possessing between 2.7 and 3.6 hectares or between 1,500 and 2,000 drachmas (according to fourth-century criteria),<sup>92</sup> might have made an effort to buy their own weapons (at least the essentials), which were then inherited by their children. Especially the young, who were those who normally served as *epibatai*, would have thus earned an important bonus for their families between the ages of 18 and 30, before inheriting and marrying. Such people would have probably been considered as ‘elite’ *thētes*.

It cannot be ruled out that the poorest *zeugitai* with around 3.6-4.5 hectares, especially young men from families with more than one child, might have volunteered to serve as *epibatai* for a salary, although it is impossible to know how this might have affected their possible mandatory conscription from the hoplite list, after their alleged enrolment in the navy. It is more conceivable to assume that these poorer *zeugitai* (in the lower bracket) could also be recruited as voluntary hoplites to earn a bonus, but in land campaigns, before they were raised from the lists, as an Aristophanes’ passage seems to be inferred.<sup>93</sup>

The significant demographic changes in Athens during the war would have altered the alleged practice of *thētes* volunteering as *epibatai* due to the loss of human life, the constant, pressing need for military personnel in all areas, and the general impoverishment of the population (whose lands were devastated by raids, etc.). We have already seen how, at the time of the Mytilene revolt (428) when Athens had 250 active ships, all the citizens were conscripted into the navy, except for the first two census classes, the least numerous. On that occasion the *zeugitai* embarked as regular crew members, which was exceptional.<sup>94</sup> It can be assumed that in Aetolia, in 426, the 300 *epibatai* on board the ships might still have been *thētes*. They were called *beltistoi* because they really were an elite citizen group in a very

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92. Of the 12,000 *thētes* with between 1,000 and 2,000 drachmas in the fourth century (see n. 69), at least 6,000 might have possessed between 1,500 to 2,000 drachmas. In fifth century, this figure might have been much higher thanks to the Empire’s prosperity. At any rate, 33.3 per cent of 6,000 is equivalent to c. 2,000 *thētes*, enough to fill the vacant *epibatai* posts on 200 ships. In the same vein, c. 9,000 *thētes* in that wealth bracket would have been required to man 300 ships with *epibatai*. But in 428, with 250 active ships (c. 2,500 *epibatai*), Athens had to recruit exceptionally *zeugitai* for the fleet (see n. 42). So (also considering the plague) there would perhaps have been no more than 2,000 available *epibatai thētes* trained to fight; for the importance of naval training: Thuc. I, 142, 7-9; B. STRAUSS, «Naval battles and sieges» in P.A.G. SABIN, H. VAN WEES, M. WHITBY eds., *The Cambridge history of Greek and Roman warfare*, Cambridge 2007, p. 226-228, 235. It is perfectly understandable how the 120 dead *epibatai* in Aetolia (see n. 14) were really a combat elite, given the suggested number of available *thētes epibatai* in this age bracket (all in the prime of their life), which was decreasing at the time.

93. Ar., *Aves*, 1364-9; see M.R. CHRIST, «Conscription...», *op. cit.* n. 33, p. 399. H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...», *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 25 posits that volunteers presented themselves at an early stage and that the generals registered their names on the “lists”, before making up the required numbers with conscripts.

94. See n. 42.

specific age bracket (between 20 and 30 years old), with physical and moral excellence,<sup>95</sup> and specifically an elite within the *thētes* who embarked on the ships. Furthermore, the *epibatai* were always Athenians, when many rowers were now foreigners and slaves.

In Sicily, the *epibatai* were still *thētes*, according to Thucydides.<sup>96</sup> Here, the exception would not be so much, in my opinion, that the *epibatai* were *thētes* and/or volunteers,<sup>97</sup> but that in this case the cost of their weapons was probably defrayed by the state. It is perhaps the last time in which *thētes epibatai* serving in the navy are still clearly mentioned in the sources. A fragment of Antiphon (*Contra Philinus*), quoted in Harpocration's aforementioned lexicon, contains the expression 'to make *all* the *thētes* hoplites'.<sup>98</sup> As Munn has shown, this expression should be read in the context of the expedition to Sicily.<sup>99</sup> On that occasion, there were not enough *thētes* with hoplite equipment, so the state must have had to arm many of them for this major and extraordinary expedition. In Sicily, these *thētes* represented the fleet and made libations, thus indicating that, notwithstanding their status, they were held in very high esteem as crew members.<sup>100</sup>

95. J.F. CHARLES, «The Marines of Athens», *CJ* 44, 1948, p. 184 interprets *beltistoi* as referring to physical excellence; also J.S. MORRISON *et al.*, *The Athenian Trireme...*, *op. cit.* n. 13, p. 110: "in physique an elite force". T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 59 (they were "among the fittest and most skilled of the city's hoplites"). Physical fitness of the *epibatai*: L. RAWLING, *The Ancient Greeks at War*, Manchester-New York 2007, p.123-124. See n. 14.

96. See n. 23. In this interpretation, they were "*thētes*", "*misthotoi*" or "hirelings who worked for wages", "hired labourers": V. ROSIVACH, «Thētes in Thucydides 6.43.1», *Hermes* 140, 2012, p. 131-139; D. PRITCHARD, *Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 41. To my mind, in this text the term *thētes* refers to the Solonian class, but what is interesting is that with this term Thucydides was also perhaps simultaneously evoking "the lowest classes in need of wages", because at that time there were practically no *thētes epibatai* who could serve without financial aid: see next notes.

97. *Thētes*, in this case, as an exception: see n. 24.

98. Fr. 61 Thalheim = fr. 63 Sauppe: τε θήτας ἅπαντας ὀπλίτας ποιῆσαι. Emphasis added. The expression, both sarcastic and critical (see next note), might indicate that only a select group from among the *thētes* would have usually possessed hoplite weaponry. On this occasion, the point is that there were not any/enough *thētes* who could afford the necessary equipment, so the state had to equip those among their number who did not have the means to purchase it in normal circumstances, thus converting *all* the *thētes* into hoplites.

99. M. MUNN, *The School of History: Athens in the Age of Socrates*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 2000, p. 100-101: "Known for this oligarchic views, Antiphon would certainly not have been a supporter of the expedition, nor would he have endorsed the elevation of *thētes* to hoplite status. This biographical note, then, must be a garbled inference drawn, at second or third hand, from some discussion of the subject of arming *thētes* and manning a fleet in a speech by Antiphon. In all probability, the speech attacked the legality of an innovative policy of arming poor Athenians through a liturgy imposed upon the wealthy."

100. For the high esteem in which the Athenian citizenry held its fleet: D. PRITCHARD, «The Standing of Sailors in Democratic Athens» in *The Athenian Funeral Oration: 40 Years after Nicole Loraux*, Strasbourg 2018, p. 10-11.

After Sicily, hoplites *ek katalogou* were perhaps recruited for the first time as *epibatai* in Chios.<sup>101</sup> Thenceforth, it would be a matter of course. The demographic situation and the needs of the war perhaps led to a change in the selection procedure for *epibatai*. When it was anticipated that there would not be enough volunteers with hoplite weaponry for the ships, hoplites *ek katalogou* were conscripted to cover the shortfall, something that ended up becoming a frequent solution. This would explain why Democleides, Andocides and the *epibatai* in the IG I<sup>3</sup> 1032 decree were highly reputed and comfortably off: after all, they were hoplites *ek katalogou*. So, it was in the naval Battle of Arginusae in which even the *hippeis* embarked.<sup>102</sup> During the Deceleian War (as of 413), in the wake of the Sicilian debacle, Athens was plunged into a demographic crisis. By the end of the war it seems that the city had a population of no more than 20,000 to 25,000 (that is, less than half of that in 431),<sup>103</sup> of whom only 5,000 were ‘landless’.<sup>104</sup> In addition, the economic capacity of the Athenians, especially the lower classes, would have been greatly diminished, to the point that, a few years later, Aristophanes called the *demos*, usually characterised as poor (*penes* or *aporoí*), ‘beggars’ (*ptochos*).<sup>105</sup>

#### 5. – POSSIBLE ALLUSIONS TO THĒTES EPIBATAI IN THE SOURCES

A passage from Plato’s *Laws* has been used to contend that the *epibatai* had a high social position, since it seems that this author calls them ‘*beltistoi*’, like Thucydides.<sup>106</sup> However, a careful reading evinces that the author draws a clear distinction between ‘staunch foot soldiers’, who regularly fought on land, and the ‘naval soldiery’ (ἐκ ναυτικῆς ὀπλατείας), who he does not hold in such high esteem. Let us examine the passage in question:

When Minos, once upon a time, reduced the people of Attica [706b] to a grievous payment of tribute, he was very powerful by sea, whereas they possessed no warships at that time such as they have now, nor was their country so rich in timber that they could easily supply themselves with a naval force. Hence they were unable quickly to copy the naval methods of their enemies and drive them off by becoming sailors themselves. And indeed it would have profited them to lose seventy times seven children [706c] rather than to become marines instead of staunch foot-soldiers (πρὶν ἀντὶ πεζῶν ὀπλατῶν μονίμων ναυτικοῦς γενομένους ἐθισθῆναι);

101. In 428, *zeugitai* were also conscripted to man the fleet and they must have surely served as *epibatai* and as rowers. See n. 42.

102. See *supra* n. 44.

103. M.H. HANSEN, *Three Studies...*, *op. cit.* n. 39, p. 22-23, 26, 28.

104. Dion. Hal., *De Lysia*, 32-33.

105. Ar., *Plutus*, 535 ff. The passage in this work that mentions (Ar., *Plutus*, 451 with scholium) depositing arms as pledges (see van H. VAN WEES, «Citizens and Soldiers...» –in n. 4–, p. 11 with n. 30) is interesting insofar as it indicates that “poor” people (now defined by Aristophanes as beggars) might have owned their own equipment (the breastplate and buckler). For poverty in classical Athens, see recently A. FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, *Realidades e imágenes de la pobreza en la Atenas clásica: una visión global del fenómeno en la época de la democracia*, Ph.D. Universidad Complutense de Madrid 2020.

106. See n. 14 and 15.

*for marines are habituated to jumping ashore frequently and running back at full speed to their ships, and they think no shame of not dying boldly at their posts when the enemy attack; and excuses are readily made for them, as a matter of course, when they fling away their arms and betake themselves to what they describe as ‘no dishonorable flight.’ These ‘exploits’ are the usual result of employing naval soldiery (ἐκ ναυτικῆς ὀπλιτείας), and they merit, not ‘infinite praise,’ but precisely the opposite; [706d] for one ought never to habituate men to base habits, and least of all the noblest section of the citizens. That such an institution is not a noble one might have been learnt even from Homer.<sup>107</sup>*

Plato criticises the use of ‘naval soldiery’ because of the marines’ (*epibatai*) habit of ditching their arms and sprinting back to the ships, which he calls ‘no dishonorable flight’, an aspect that seemingly formed part of their *modus operandi*. He also contrasts hoplite fighting on foot with that of the *epibatai*, which he reviles and considers as inferior. He then goes on to point out that, in the main, men should not become accustomed to these base habits, before remarking, ‘and least of all the noblest section of the citizens’. In this part, he may be referring to citizens of hoplite status who, at least since the end of the Peloponnesian War (the Deceleian War), could serve as *epibatai* on a regular basis due to the dire demographic and military circumstances at the time. This does not imply that these practices were not generally extended to a larger group of men, as implied just earlier in the sentence, possibly referring to a broader social collective, which would have included citizens below the rank of hoplite; all of them (richer or poorer) were Athenians since the *epibatai* were always recruited from among the citizen body.<sup>108</sup> As already noted, Plato is of the mind that the hoplite fighting of the *epibatai* is inferior to that of ordinary or regular hoplites. He takes this stance not only because he probably despises their fighting techniques—rather cowardly because of their proclivity to flight—but also possibly because he holds a clear ideological position vis-à-vis naval warfare and those participating in it. These groups were, by and large, of a lower social status than those who usually fought in the regular infantry contingents. Indeed, behind Plato’s dismissal of the *epibatai* as second-class infantry soldiers, there is probably contempt not only for their more “cowardly” military tactics on the battlefield, but also for the lower classes as a whole. In any case, he doubtless distinguishes between ordinary hoplites and ‘naval soldiery’ (*epibatai*), as seen in the previous passages.

Another source that may offer valuable insights into the practice of recruiting men from the lower classes—namely, the *thētes*—to serve as *epibatai* is Aristophanes’ *Wasps*. In this comedy (422 BC), the judges of Athens are described as being poor, with an urgent need for cash and hungry for wages.<sup>109</sup> They are also old. Hansen has postulated that, as a rule, most of those who volunteered to take part in the sortition in the *dikasteria* would have been older

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107. Plato, *Leges*, 706d. Emphasis added.

108. See n. 20.

109. Difficulties in feeding the family: Ar., *Vespae*, 305-315. Importance of judges’ income for the family economy: Ar., *Vespae*, 605-614.



(now unable to undertake any other task) and humble *thētes*.<sup>110</sup> Philocleon and the judges of the chorus are all in their dotage. The work is full of military metaphors and especially allusions to naval warfare<sup>111</sup>.

At one point—Philocleon being held by his son and guarded by two servants—the leader of the chorus evokes the Siege of Naxos<sup>112</sup> and Philocleon’s fearless flight, after stealing some spits.<sup>113</sup> When his son realises that he is running away, resorting to a marine metaphor he remarks, ‘Mount quick to the other window, strike him with the boughs that hang over the entrance; perhaps he will turn back (πρύμνην ἀνακρούσεται) when he feels himself being thrashed.’<sup>114</sup> This passage might be evoking a type of naval action similar to that described in the previous passage from Plato, stressing the issue of flight (‘no dishonorable flight’), although it could also refer to the pillaging of the rowers and crews of the ships in territory enemy.<sup>115</sup> In any case, *epibatai* fighting tactics frequently involved disembarking, attacking forts, plundering and retreating back to the ships, like in Plato description of such tactics including ‘individual skill at running, ambushing, and fighting’.<sup>116</sup>

110. M.H. HANSEN, *The Athenian Democracy...*, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 183-186: the majority of judges in the courts are aged (Ar., *Eq.* 255) and poor.

111. *Naumachia: Vespae*, 379, 398-399 (see n. 114); Salamis: *Vespae*, 1078-1090; as observed by Z.P. BILES, S.D. OLSON, *Aristophanes Wasps*, Oxford 2015, p. 403, “the battle described in what follows seems to be modelled in the first instance on Marathon”, before also pointing out that “the actions and motivations assigned the enemy thus reflect instead what happened in 480 BCE” (Hdt. VIII, 8.50-53); the “fire and smoke over our city” [1080] refers to Salamis, not to Marathon, and the owl that “had flown over our army” (1086) corresponds to the one that, “flying from the right, perched on the masthead of Themistokles’s ship before the battle of Salamis” (Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 12); J. NEILS, «Salpinx, Snake, and Salamis: The Political Geography of the Pella Hydria», *Hesperia* 82, 2013, p. 607. Artemisium: *Vespae*, 1122-1124; see K.E. BORTHWICK, «*Observations on the Opening Scene of Aristophanes’ Wasps*» *CQ* 42, 1992, p. 277: “the scholia even take the naming of the specific wind to allude to the destruction of the Persian fleet at Artemisium, also notably related by Herodotus (VII, 188-9), in gratitude for which the Athenian erected a temple to Boreas”; the cloak (*tribon*) that Philocleon refuses to take off is the “poor man’s cloak”: see M. CANEVARO, «The popular culture of the Athenian institutions: ‘authorized’ popular culture and ‘unauthorized’ elite culture in classical Athens», in L. GRIG ed., *Popular Culture in the Ancient World*, Cambridge 2017, p. 60 (with references). Also in verse 602 in which Philocleon says, “See then what good things you deprive and despoil me of. Pray, is this obeying or being a slave, as you pretended to be able to prove?” σκέψαι μὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἷων ἀποκλήεις καὶ κατερύκεις, ἦν δουλείαν οὐσαν ἔφασκες καὶ ὑπηρεσίαν ἀποδείξειν. The term *hypēresia* as “servitude” but with a veiled allusion, as Jordan believes, to service in the fleet: B. JORDAN, «The Crews of Athenian Triremes», *AC* 69, 2000, p. 95.

112. For this episode in about 471: Thuc. I, 98.

113. Ar., *Vespae*, 354-356: “Do you recall how, when you were with the army at the taking of Naxos, you descended so readily from the top of the wall by means of the spits you had stolen?” Trans. E. O’NEILL.

114. Ar., *Vespae*, 398-399: ἀνάβαιν’ ἀνύσας κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν καὶ ταῖσιν φυλλάσι παῖε, ἦν πῶς πρύμνην ἀνακρούσεται πληγείς ταῖς εἰρεσιώνας, πρύμνην ἀνακρούσεται can mean, according to *LSJ* “to put one’s ship astern, by backing water” or “row back”.

115. S. POTTS, *The Athenian navy: an investigation into the operations, politics and ideology of the Athenian fleet between 480 and 322 BC*, PhD Thesis, Cardiff University 2008, p. 60-61.

116. T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 59. See also M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide’s...», *op. cit.* n. 7.

In *Wasps*, the member of the chorus of old judges introduce themselves twice as former rowers in their youth. The first passage reads as follows:

Oh! at that time I was terrible, I feared nothing; forth on my galleys I went in search of my foe and subjected him. [1095] Then we never thought of rounding fine phrases, we never dreamt of calumny; it was who should prove the strongest rower. And thus we took many a town from the Medes, and [1100] 'tis to us that Athens owes the tributes that our young men thieve today.<sup>117</sup>

While in the second they complain,

Finally, we have among us drones, [1115] who have no sting and who, without giving themselves the least trouble, seize on our revenues as they flow past them and devour them. 'Tis this that grieves us most of all, to see men who have never served or held either lance or oar in defence of their country, enriching themselves at our expense without ever raising a blister on their hands (μήτε κώπην μήτε λόγχην μήτε φλύκταιναν λαβών). [1120] In short, I give it as my deliberate opinion that in future every citizen not possessed of a sting shall not receive the triobolus.<sup>118</sup>

In this passage, the accent is placed on service as a rower, a point that is stressed later on with the reference to the blisters raised by rowing, albeit including service with a lance among these expressions relating to the navy. The term used for lance is *λόγχη*, which is usually translated as “javelin”. In my opinion, it is likely that the author is also referring here to naval service but as *epibatai*, therefore without abandoning the naval context of the passage in which the collection of the *phoros* has been previously mentioned.<sup>119</sup> Specifically, the weapons used by the *epibatai* during naval battles included javelins (*logchai*), as evidenced by different passages analysed by Zaccarini.<sup>120</sup> It was a more flexible form of fighting in which other throwing weapons were also used. Diodorus Siculus, when describing the *epibatai* of both warring parties who fought at Abydos in 411, notes,

Nor did the men whose position was on the decks fail to maintain the zeal which brooked no failure; but some, while still at a considerable distance from the enemy, kept up a stream of arrows and soon the space was full of missiles, while others, each time that they drew near, would hurl their javelins (τὰς λόγχας), some doing their best to strike the defending marines

117. Ar., *Vespae*, 1091-1101.

118. Ar., *Vespae*, 1114-1120. See Z.P. BILES, S.D. OLSON, *Aristophanes...*, *op. cit.* n. 111, p. 414 (“reference first to rowing, then to hoplite fighting”).

119. Ar., *Vespae*, 1100.

120. M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide's...», *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 212-213; see also T. HERZOGENRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 58.

(ἐπιβάτας) and others the enemy pilots themselves; and whenever the ships would come close together, they would not only fight with their spears but at the moment of contact would also leap over on the enemy's triremes and carry on the contest with their swords.<sup>121</sup>

If the passage from *Wasps* is interpreted in this way, it might be a reference to young Athenians of low social standing (the chorus of judges)—in all likelihood *thētes*—who served as rowers and *epibatai* on board the ships during the Pentecontaetia, and who, in their dotage, sat as judges in the courts in the 420s, during the Peloponnesian War.

The *epibatai* did not only fight at sea, for they also disembarked to fight on land, to besiege cities and to launch other assault, pillaging and ambush operations.<sup>122</sup> The most famous example is that of the 300 *epibatai* who in 426 fought and perished in Aetolia, deserving the name of '*beltistoi*',<sup>123</sup> but it is not the only one.<sup>124</sup> Perhaps two other passages from this comedy can be better understood from this perspective. In the first, Bdelycleon reminds his father about the penalties that the latter has had to endure to obtain tribute from the cities for fighting 'on land and sea'<sup>125</sup> and the little he had received for his pains. In the second, Bdelycleon insists on the same idea, but this time pointing out more explicitly, 'You have so painfully earned in the galleys, in battles and sieges' (οὐς αὐτὸς ἐλαύνων 685 καὶ πεζομαχῶν καὶ πολιορκῶν ἐκτίσω πολλὰ πονήτας).<sup>126</sup> In my view, both passages might refer, yet again, to naval warfare, to which the comedy constantly alludes, and specifically to the lower classes serving as rowers and as *epibatai*, as Philocleon did. Indeed, the last expression is almost identical to the one Plutarch attributes to Alcibiades<sup>127</sup> when haranguing his crew and *epibatai* in Cyzicus: 'Sea-fighting, land-fighting and siege-fighting' (ναυμαχεῖν καὶ πεζομαχεῖν καὶ νῆ Δία τευχομαχεῖν). In Herzogenrath-Amelung's words, 'These examples should suffice to illustrate the wide range of tasks naval infantry was expected to perform on land.'<sup>128</sup>

Philocleon and Bdelycleon are obviously not real characters. Nor might it have been Aristophanes' intention to paint the picture of real family. Rather, it is more plausible that the comedialographer wanted to represent the conflict between father and son—that is, the struggle between generations—as well as the tension between the lower classes, related to the courts, the *phoros* and the 'poor'—the *demos*, in short—on the one hand, and those of high social

121. Diodorus Siculus, XIII, 46, 1 (Trans. C.H. OLDFATHER). M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide's...», *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 413-414; T. HERZOGENTRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 58.

122. B. STRAUSS, «Naval battles...», *op. cit.* n. 92, p. 228-229; M. ZACCARINI, «Thucydide's...», *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 214-215; T. HERZOGENTRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 59-60.

123. See n. 14.

124. T. HERZOGENTRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 60-61.

125. Ar., *Vespae*, 679: "[...] to you as a reward for all your toil both on land and sea": πολλὰ μὲν ἐν γῆ πολλὰ δ' ἐφ' ὑγρῶπιτυλεύσας.

126. Ar., *Vespae*, 685.

127. Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, XXVIII, 2.

128. T. HERZOGENTRATH-AMELUNG, «Social Status...», *op. cit.* n. 5, p. 61.

standing, on the other. The latter tended towards to tyranny and oligarchy and were fond of the symposium, expensive clothes, hunting, philolaconism, etc.<sup>129</sup> This conflict occurred in a war context in which the young would, through the aristocratic *hetaireiai* and their manoeuvring, pave the way for the oligarchic revolution.<sup>130</sup> The presence of servants (slaves) does not offer any indication of the social position of a ‘real’ family since the home of Philocleon and Bdelycleon is a construct with two opposite social (or socioeconomic) poles. Even so, the *thētes* serving as *epibatai*, as Philocleon supposedly did, might have owned a small workshop or family farm (less than 2,000 drachmas according to fourth-century criteria) and, at best, some slaves, but they were still considered to be ‘poor’.<sup>131</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

The indications that the *epibatai*—always Athenian citizens—were generally *volunteer* hoplites, as well as the distinction in the sources between regular hoplites *ek katalogou* and *epibatai*, remain essential, despite criticism, for reflecting on who served as such in Athens. It is very likely that, in the main, the hoplites ‘from the lists’ did not volunteer to serve in the fleet on a regular basis (barring a number of exceptions), since they were in great demand, service was onerous and measures were even taken to avoid any exemptions, like, for example, for the *hippeis*. Serving as a volunteer *epibates* or in the fleet as a rower, also on a voluntary basis, does not appear to have exempted those recruited from the hoplite *katalogos* from fighting as such on land. Those *epibatai* on the top rungs of the socioeconomic ladder who appear in the sources all served as such in the last part of the Peloponnesian War, when due to the drastic drop in Athens’ population and the demands of the conflict (especially naval warfare), hoplites ‘from the lists’ began to serve as *epibatai*, first forcibly and, later on, possibly routinely (*epibatai* recruited ‘from the lists’ for this purpose). Previously, the *voluntary character* of service as *epibatai*, as was also the case with rowers, has led me to believe that those who embarked as *epibatai*, except in exceptional or emergency situations—such as Salamis or at some moments during the Peloponnesian War, especially after the Sicilian debacle—in which recourse was had to the lists, were *thētes* with hoplite equipment. These *epibatai thētes* might possibly have been an ‘elite’ among the *thētes*, those who were better off, namely, with property valued between 1,000/1,500 and 2,000 drachmas, according to fourth-century criteria. They were also generally young people aged between 20 and 30, as the service was very physically demanding and their versatile and flexible fighting techniques frequently involved the use of throwing weapons such as javelins. The cost of hoplite equipment, the bare minimum being a sword and a shield, could be relatively affordable, and it could also be inherited. In Athens

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129. Ar., *Vespae*, 1005, 1132-1147, 1169-70, 1188-1189, 1202-4, 1212-1222, 1256-1261.

130. See N. LORAUX, *The Divided City: On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens*, New York 2001 [1997]; J.L. SHEAR, *Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens*, Cambridge 2011.

131. For the “poverty” of the *demos*, see recently: A FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, *Realidades...*, *op. cit.* n. 105.

during the Pentecontaetia there were a very high number of *thētes*, a significant proportion of whom might have had sufficient resources/wealth to pay for the weapons required to serve as *epibatai*, a service that, in addition to being an honour, provided young men from modest families with a substantial source of income. On the other hand, it should not be ruled out that on some occasions it was the state or a particular trierarch (such as Cimon) who armed and trained their *epibatai*, as might have been the case in Sicily where the *epibatai* were *thētes*. In this case, many impoverished *thētes* were perhaps armed by the state, Thucydides thus giving a deliberately ambiguous tone to the term ‘*thētes*’ in this context, taking into account its two meanings: the census class and those who work for a wage. Additionally, the expression employed by Antiphon (‘make all the *thētes* hoplites’) has ironic connotations, since he might have been referring to the poorest among the *thētes* (given the circumstances, the vast majority), since it was unusual for them to serve as hoplites, a honour reserved for an exclusive minority formed by the financially better off young men among their number. If weapons were given to the poorest, *all thētes* could become hoplites, a possibility viewed with suspicion and sarcasm.<sup>132</sup>

This dovetails with the belief at least in oligarchical circles, held for example by Plato, that *epibatai* were inferior to regular hoplites. This hypothesis might be borne out by the sheer number of *thētes* and by the existence of an ‘elite’ within this group. This can also be glimpsed in certain allusions in Aristophanes’ *Wasps*, which is replete with marine images and metaphors and in which the lower classes were essential to the Athenian fleet, not only as rowers but also as *epibatai*. In the ideology attributed to the *demos* by the comedigrapher, naval warfare was crucial for obtaining the *phoros*, for dominating Greece and also for paying the wages of judges, regardless of whether or not the *phoros* was used to this end.<sup>133</sup>

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132. See n. 98.

133. Ar., *Vespae*, 655-663 and sch. to Ar., *Vespae*, 684 (see also [Arist.] *Athenaion Politeia*, XXIV, 3). See P.J. RHODES, «Democracy and Empire» in L.J. SAMONS II ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles*, New York-Cambridge 2007, p. 24-35. Even though judges’ wages were not directly paid out of the *phoros*: L. KALLET MARX, «Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?», *ClAnt* 20, 1989, p. 252-266; A. GIOVANNINI, «Le Parthénon, le Trésor d’Athéna et le tribut des alliés», *Historia* 3, 1990, p. 129-148, the Empire and the prosperity that it generated undoubtedly affected them: see L.J. SAMONS II, «Athenian Finance and the Treasury of Athena», *Historia* 42, 1993, p. 129-138; L.J. SAMONS II, *Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance*, Stuttgart 2000, p. 156. For the finances of the Athenian Empire: A. BLAMIRE, «Athenian Finance, 454–404 bc», *Hesperia* 70, 2001, p. 99-126; L. KALLET, «Accounting for Culture in Fifth Century Athens» in S. BOEDEKER, K.A. RAAFLAUB eds., *Democracy, Empire and the arts in Fifth-Century Athens*, Cambridge 1998, p. 43-58; V. GABRIELSEN, «Finance and Taxes» in H. BECK ed., *A Companion to Ancient Greek Government*, Oxford 2013, p. 332-346; D. PRITCHARD, *Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens*, Austin 2015. For the rôle of *thētes* in the fleet see recently: M. VALDÉS, «Los thetes y la flota ateniense en el s.V: ¿una cuestión retórica?» in M. PI CORRALES *et al.* eds., *La Batalla: análisis históricos y militares*, Madrid 2020, p. 163-208.



## SOMMAIRE

## ARTICLES :

Cédric BRÉLAZ, Séverine BLIN, Quentin MILLIET, Éric SAPIN, <i>Un document comptable sur lamelle de plomb et autres objets métalliques inscrits du site de Mandeuze, cité des Séquanes (avec un appendice sur la méthode de déchiffrement)</i> .....	315
Miriam VALDÉS GUÍA, <i>Thêtes epibatai in fifth-century Athens</i> .....	351
Marie DURNERIN, Nicolas SIRON, <i>Lettres et politique. La communication écrite des stratèges athéniens en campagne à l'époque classique</i> .....	379
Antoine CHABOD, <i>Poétesse, guérillera, héroïne civique : Télésilla d'Argos en maîtresse de vérité</i> ..	401
Jerrad LANCASTER, <i>On the character of Kasmenai</i> .....	429
Paola GAGLIARDI, <i>Ancora sul processo di Cornelio Gallo</i> .....	451
Simon CAHANIER, <i>Une autre mémoire des guerres romaines : l'identité des communautés hispaniques au prisme de la conquête</i> .....	471
Alberto CAFARO, <i>Senatus milesque et populus: il Senato, le legioni, l'impero secondo il senatore Tacito</i> .....	503

## LECTURES CRITIQUES

Michel CHRISTOL, <i>Des mots et des images : les monnaies comme source documentaire de l'histoire impériale romaine</i> .....	527
María José ESTARÁN TOLOSA, <i>Onomástica, alteridad Y contacto lingüístico en el Mediterráneo Antiguo</i> .....	553
Comptes rendus.....	563
Notes de lectures .....	661
Table alphabétique par noms d'auteurs.....	663
Table des auteurs d'ouvrages recensés.....	667
Liste des ouvrages reçus .....	671